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William Nelson Crabtree 
THE REORGANIZATION OF THE SCHOOL OF ALLIED HEALTH SCIENCES AT 
WHITMAN UNIVERSITY: A CASE STUDY 
This study employed a case study design to explore the phenomena surrounding 
the reorganization of a School of Allied Health Sciences (SAHS). Using qualitative 
research methods, three structural categories of interest—internal forces, external forces, 
and leadership--were identified to guide the data collection and analysis. The themes 
within each structural category were then identified and categorized. Data analysis was 
accomplished via a framework of organizational theories. The significance of this study 
is found in its applicability to the cases of other schools of allied health sciences, which 
are experiencing financial and identity challenges nationwide. 
The reorganization of the SAHS was a two-year process involving multiple 
procedural steps with complex manifestations. The leadership of the school was found to 
be the most dominant structural category characterizing the nature of the school’s 
reorganization process. Internal and external forces were contributing factors, but were 
less influential than the role of leadership. Organizational change during the school’s 
reorganization was influenced greatly by the communication disconnect between the 
Dean and the faculty, specifically the perception that the Dean’s academic and budgetary 
plan was not the result of a rational decision making process and lacked validity. The 
overall organizational problem of the SAHS was found to be an identity problem 
whereby the SAHS was trying to fulfill its academic mission as part of the medical 
school and the economic reality of this context. 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
The Whitman University 1 School of Allied Health Sciences (SAHS) as part of a 
large academic health center (AHC) finds itself being forced into reorganization due to 
dire financial exigencies. The SAHS is composed of traditional academic allied health 
programs granting Associate, Baccalaureate and graduate degrees.  The mandated closure 
of the SAHS represents the end stage of a decade-long experiment in higher education. 
The experiment began when the school moved toward an “incubator” school status within 
its parent school, the School of Medicine, in the early 1990s. This “school within a 
school” configuration was to allow the SAHS to eventually become a freestanding 
school, or academic unit. The outcome of this experiment in organizational change 
represents a common theme now occurring across the country. Schools of allied health 
are finding it difficult to survive due to internal and external forces within today’s 
academic health center environment.  
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this dissertation will be to “tell the story” of the reorganization of 
the SAHS at a large Midwestern academic health center located in Whitman University.  
The specific focus of this study will be to demonstrate how the reorganization progressed 
by illuminating the life cycle of this academic hybrid of a “school within a school.” 
Significance of the Study 
A review of the literature has revealed that there has not previously been a 
research study similar in scope and methodology related to an allied health school in this 
context.  The significance of this research is that it is an original inquiry into an important 
                                                 
1
 Whitman University is a fictitious name that will be used in place of the name of the actual university 
studied to help maintain the study participants’ anonymity. 
 2 
trend in academic medicine. Thus, this research effort offers perspectives on the utility of 
organizational models in analyzing similar cases.  It also provides insights that can help 
other allied health schools facing similar problems to anticipate what lies ahead so that 
they can prepare strategies for change. 
Conceptual and Operational Orientation 
An in-depth investigation of the SAHS will serve as the core of inquiry, forming 
the premises for a case study exploring the phenomena surrounding the reorganization of 
the school. Three separate structural categories will be used to characterize the forces 
contributing to the school’s reorganization and to guide the data collection and analysis 
while keeping the study within feasible limits: internal forces, external forces and 
leadership. 
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Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
Introduction 
The SAHS was situated in the rapidly changing environment of a large academic 
health center (AHC) located in an urban setting. Forces within this environment have 
played an important developmental role in shaping the personality and organizational 
characteristics of the school. Moreover, the SAHS has had to struggle with a generic 
allied health identity problem, which plagues most schools of allied health nationally. 
Historically, allied health programs have been placed in a myriad of homes including 
nursing schools, medical schools, schools of agriculture as well as schools of allied 
health.  They consist of multiple units that range from technology associates degrees to 
the doctorate, and the variety of programs constituting allied health differs from one 
campus to another. So, it is hard to say that there is any one consistent interpretation of 
what defines a school of allied health. Therefore, in order to gain an understanding of the 
factors that led to the school’s reorganization, it is important to appreciate not only the 
environment in which the school existed but to also have an understanding of the 
conglomerate of health professions known as allied health along with the unique aspects 
of allied health education. This chapter will review the literature related to these themes 
and discuss some of the basic aspects of leadership in an academic health center as a 
means to develop the background for the case study. Additionally, organizational aspects 
of colleges and universities relevant to the context of the case study will be reviewed. 
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Academic Health Centers 
Purpose, Mission and Role of Academic Health Centers 
The goal of medical education is to prepare health care professionals to meet the 
challenges of practice by fulfilling their roles as clinicians, educators and resource 
managers (Gonnella, Callahan, Louis, Hojat, Erdman, 2004).  Academic health centers 
have an important role in providing an infrastructure and expertise for both education and 
health services research. Today’s academic health center is a complex of institutions that 
educates health professionals, including a university, a medical school, at least one other 
health professional school and one or more teaching hospitals (Kimmey, 1994). There are 
over 121 centers in the United States that meet this definition. AHCs are the principal 
facilities for health professions education, medical and health services research and 
complex medical case management. AHCs offer a wide array of programs including both 
undergraduate and graduate medical education and training for other health professions 
along with related education and research activities. Moreover, academic health centers 
have had their mission expanded recently as part of homeland defense and the war on 
terrorism (Eastwood, 2003). In the event of a national disaster, AHCs will be the first 
responders for delivering healthcare to the injured. In addition to their academic mission, 
AHCs provide care for the underserved, specialized treatment and community service 
(Stevens, Lynm, and Glass, 2004). Unfortunately, this system has gotten into trouble as 
the economy has weakened and changed. Tuition revenues have failed to provide the 
resources to cover the costs of medical education including the cost of maintaining large 
teaching hospitals and research facilities.  
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What is happening today in AHCs is in many ways a reflection of what is 
occurring in higher education in general: trying to do more with less. However, there are 
certain characteristics of AHCs that distinguish them from mainstream higher education. 
Their social responsibility in terms of their service roles to patients and their communities 
has a profound effect on the functioning of faculty within that framework.  
Organizational influences outside the academy, including the effects of managed care 
also play a role in distinguishing AHCs from the rest of academe. Nevertheless, AHCs 
are part of the academy and their citizens are part of the academic ethic described by 
Shils (1983), whereby “the academic ethic is the sum of these obligations which are 
involved in the pursuit and transmission of advanced knowledge and in roles and in 
conduct affected by the real or presumed possession of such knowledge.” A study 
conducted in the late 1990s by the Association of Academic Health Centers was 
performed to determine the response of academic health centers to their rapid and 
dramatic evolution (Osterweis, 1998). The study focused primarily on issues surrounding 
changes in the overall organization, structure and governance of AHCs. The 
overwhelming impression from these findings is that many academic health centers are 
making profound changes in every aspect of their organizations to cope with the new 
health care environment while remaining academic in mission.  
Historical Perspective 
John White (1997) views the function of the AHC as vocational education by its 
very nature and poorly adapted to other ideals. So where does the mission of the 
academic health center fit in the overall purpose and mission of higher education?  
Perhaps the research mission of the AHC would fit into this “scheme of things” but isn’t 
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medical education just another form of vocational education? During the early years of 
American higher education, medicine was considered one of three professions, the others 
being divinity and law (Rudolf, 1990). However, one of the characteristics of the 
university movement, which occurred during the early to mid 1800s, was the blurring of 
the connotation of profession and that of vocation. Recognition of the need for a more 
broadly practical education was emerging. It was also during this period that universities 
assumed the responsibility for providing formal professional education. Vocationalism or 
career preparation was one way for American higher education to enter into the life of the 
people due to the expansion of the number of careers that were in demand that required 
formal study and instruction (Rudolf, 1990). Interestingly, the university movement did 
not actually intrude upon the spirit of professionalism. The American college was still 
considered preprofessional. After all, it was in 1765 that the first professorship in 
medicine appeared at the College of Philadelphia. However, what did happen as a result 
of the university movement was that many colleges entered into alliances or federations 
with already existing medical schools, particularly in the cities, resulting in the 
beginnings of what we consider today to be academic health centers. 
  When reviewing the historical context of the purpose and mission of American 
higher education, it appears that then as now, the same issue is before us and that the 
defining statement for higher education in America is as elusive as ever. Clark Kerr 
points out that we are a “multiversity” (Lucas, 1996). If academic health centers are 
included in the overall scope of American higher education as they should be, then 
multiversity certainly applies.   
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Current Conditions  
Today, AHCs in the United States generally consist of multiple institutions 
sharing the missions of education, research, and patient care. The relationship between 
medical schools and their teaching hospitals involves a complex and variable mixture of 
monopoly and monopsony (market) power (Chervenak and McCullough, 2005). Medical 
schools rely on teaching hospitals for the placement of their students. Thus, the teaching 
hospital becomes a powerful force, making negotiations with the medical school more 
challenging.  The organizational structure is generally characterized as “loose” with most 
departments having considerable autonomy (Norlin and Osborn, 1998). Although there 
are many differences in their makeup, most centers include: (1) health professional 
schools, e.g., medicine, nursing, pharmacy, allied health, dentistry, (2) hospitals and 
clinics, and (3) research facilities. All of these aspects represent part of the center’s entire 
academic mission. The school’s mission generally centers on education, patient care and 
research. The faculty are links to all components of the center’s academic mission. The 
medical schools and their faculty usually represent the home of most of the leaders of the 
medical center. Strong centralized leadership is not characteristic of most academic 
medical centers (Norlin and Osborn, 1998). Other components, e.g., private practices, 
community hospitals, health maintenance organizations and research foundations are 
included in the missions of education and research. The connection of these entities to the 
academic side range from tightly coupled to independent.  
What Are the Driving Calls for Change and Reform? 
 Academic health centers have faced well-documented internal and external 
challenges over the past decade, putting pressure on organizational leaders to develop 
new strategies to improve performance, educational outcomes and research growth 
(Kirch, et al., 2005). Financing health professions education is a complex undertaking 
that involves multiple funding sources. In fact, a recent report indicates that AHCs have 
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“missed the boat” and have failed to increase their competitiveness and efficiency 
(Roszak, 2000). Another study examining the competitive market dynamics on AHCs 
between 1994 and 2000 found that AHCs now have fewer financial resources and that 
resources have decreased to the point where AHCs may no longer be able to fulfill their 
social missions (Dodson, Koenig, Sen, Ho, and Giliani, 2002). State funding for AHCs in 
particular is a concern where 22% of AHCs reported closing or downsizing educational 
programs (Neff, 2003). Academic health centers and other teaching hospitals have higher 
patient care costs than nonteaching community hospitals because of their missions of 
research, education and patient complexity (Koenig, Dobson, Ho, Siegel, Blumenthal, 
Weissman, 2003). Clearly, the most dominant external driving call for reconsideration of 
the AHC model is the challenge put upon these centers by managed care. Although the 
challenges put on the AHCs by managed care encompass all aspects of the center’s 
mission, the main concerns are the resulting financial constraints. AHCs must now ask 
themselves the question; “What financial condition must we achieve to allow us to 
accomplish our mission?” (Zelman, Blazer, Gower, Bumgarner, and Cancilla, 1999). 
Academic Health Centers and Managed Care 
 Escalating economic pressures on the clinical enterprise threaten the missions of 
education and research in many academic health centers (Pellegrini, 2001). Managed care 
and current governmental policies have had a negative impact, especially on urban 
academic health center reimbursement ( Rodriguez, Peterson, Muehlstedt, Zera, West and 
Bubrick, 2001). The health care market dynamics that support and direct the growth and 
development of the AHC have changed dramatically over the past several years (Norlin 
and Osborn, 1998). Their various missions, including education, research and care for 
patients, are at risk. The missions of education and service to communities and the 
underserved have always suffered during the evolution of the AHC; they are even more 
threatened by the emergence of managed care. Third party payers can often dictate their 
reimbursement amounts, thus greatly affecting the economics of the AHC. 
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 The “special niche” that AHCs once had as innovative and high-tech institutions 
has slowly eroded as local hospitals have started offering similar services. Thus, new 
financial pressures as a result of increasing competition are endangering the “academic 
mission” of the centers. Ultimately, the teaching and academic mission of the centers will 
have to be open to examination and questions (Reuter, 1995).  Academic institutions are 
typically resistant to change. Redefining the unique mission and organizational structure 
are future issues for AHC leaders (Harris, DaRosa, Liu and Hash, 2003).  
Academic health centers currently face the greatest challenges since their 
inception. Managed care, increased competition for research funding and inefficiencies 
all contribute to their present vulnerability (Wilson, 1996). Additionally, their increased 
reliance on clinical income to subsidize research jeopardizes the success of their missions 
(Wilson, 1996). The mission, indeed the very existence of the traditional AHC is under 
siege according to Weitekamp, Thorndyke and Evarts (1996). They insist that the 
survival of AHC depends on its ability to change. They call for organizational redesign, 
creation of strategic partnerships and adopting a cybernetic model of continuous 
measurement along with improvement and adaptability. Others have also called for a 
broader health science vision and greater collaboration (Bulger, 1996). Another problem 
that burdens many AHCs is bureaucratic red tape, which reduces their ability to respond 
to the demanding health care market. In fact, the Oregon Health Sciences University has 
chosen to change its structure from being part of the state system of higher education to 
being an independent public corporation (Alexander, Davis, and Kohler, 1997). As just 
illustrated, the challenges facing AHCs represent concerns that threaten their very 
existence. Similarly, faculty at these centers are seeing the challenges to their traditional 
faculty roles as no less of a threat to the health and viability of the AHC. 
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The Challenges to Faculty Roles at Academic Health Centers 
 
 Although health care education clearly benefits from a rich environment including 
research and patient care, faculty often find themselves in conflicting roles in the 
complex mix of activities in the academic health center (Howell and Karimbux, 2004). 
Partly because of the managed care movement and the overall assessment movement in 
higher education, AHC faculty are finding themselves under more external scrutiny and 
under greater demands for accountability. Internally, the most pressing calls for change 
are centered on faculty issues relating to the erosion of tenure and tenure track positions 
at AHCs and their replacement with nontenure track clinical ranks. As AHCs and 
universities face budget shortfalls, administrators are seeking ways to become more 
flexible and adaptable to changes in the marketplace, according to Dr. Christine M. 
Licata (Ellis, 1999). However, these types of changes are affecting faculty all across the 
academy, not just in AHCs. Administrators in all departments are seeking ways to cut 
costs and have greater flexibility. One of the common threads in this milieu is the attack 
on tenure and tenure track positions. 
Across academia, faculty are finding their more traditional roles coming under 
attack from many different directions. Many AHC administrators now view traditional 
faculty roles as arcane and unrealistic in today’s rapidly changing academic environment. 
The now classic work by Shils (1983) is an exhaustive examination of the academic 
profession. It has served as a template for what comprises academic work for many 
institutions since its publication. The author states that the report is intended to contribute 
to the reanimation of discussion regarding the proper end of academic persons and 
academic institutions. The primary premise of this work is that the academic ethic is the 
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“sum of obligations, which are involved in the pursuit and transmission of advanced 
knowledge.” Today, many AHC deans are in effect dissecting the faculty roles into 
subspecialties whereby some will be given the opportunity to pursue, acquire, and 
generate knowledge (in this case the research scientist) and others will have the 
responsibility for facilitating learning (clinical faculty). Separating these faculty roles in 
this manner, says Shils, dilutes the effectiveness of the unified approach, which helps to 
distinguish between truth and falsity. For example, Shils says that critical assessment of 
the knowledge becomes difficult. The clinically oriented faculty will for the most part be 
engaging in “vocational” technical education (Shils, 1983, p. 73). He says that these role 
changes present a dangerous situation for the academy. There is a very real danger that 
the acquired knowledge if taught without proper assessment, could be found unreliable. 
The status of the academy could then suffer a fatal blow. Therefore, the very health of the 
academy is directly related to faculty roles (Shils, 1983, p. 41). 
 Rosovsky (1990) strongly affirms the importance of tenure and states that, 
“nothing can diminish the need for academic freedom; its absence has reduced 
universities to caricatures in many parts of the contemporary world.” He views tenure as 
the very essence of academic life, allowing for a lifetime of building and renewing 
intellectual capital. Rosovsky also reminds us that nontenure track faculty generally have 
similar responsibilities as tenured faculty, only for half the pay, less status, fewer 
amenities and an uncertain future. At the University of Minnesota, fiscal constraints were 
mentioned as the primary cause for the university to consider adopting a policy that 
would allow for laying off tenured professors.  
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 On the other hand, some scholars argue for role differentiation among faculty, 
pointing out that this is not only the most economically feasible approach, but also makes 
the most appropriate use of different talents. Wergin (1994), for example, talks about 
differentiated roles within a department, assigning faculty to teaching, research and 
service in the overall proportions needed by the department, but achieving this effect by 
balancing different profiles for different faculty.  Bess (2000) argues that even within the 
teaching role, there are different tasks, some of which are better performed by a given 
faculty member than another. He concludes that teaching should be regarded as a team 
effort, where those who are good at design, lecture, discussion, assessment, coaching or 
any of the specific tasks specialize in that aspect while others contribute the rest.   
 It is especially important for administrators and faculty at academic health centers 
where market influences may call for rapid action by faculty to understand options for 
faculty roles and to make assignments intentionally in ways that will further the mission 
of the unit as well as be economically feasible. What will be needed in the future is “a 
new form of faculty management that matches the individual faculty member’s priorities 
and skills with the health center mission” (Arana and McCurdy, 1995, p. 1073). 
Summary 
Academic health centers have played an important role in the improvement of 
health care delivery during the past century. However, the current turbulent climate in 
AHCs provides an opportunity to rethink the way health care education is delivered. Both 
the AHC model itself and the role of the faculty are being challenged. The information 
age has changed every facet of our lives, so the future education of health care 
professionals may no longer be blood and guts, but bits and bites as simulation, virtual 
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reality and web based electronic learning make medical education cheaper and safer 
(Gorman, Meier, Rawn, and Krummel, 2000).  
Leadership 
 Leaders of academic health centers hold positions that by their very nature have a 
high potential for conflict (Chervenak and McCullough, 2004). Their time and energy is 
occupied by a set of tasks that oftentimes have a business orientation: enhancing revenue, 
reducing costs, recruiting and managing a diverse workforce, and dealing with customer 
satisfaction (Grigsby, Hefner, Souba and Kirch, 2004). One of the aspects of the 
Association of Academic Health Center’s study concerning the evolving structure, 
organization and governance of academic health centers (Osterweis, 1998), was to assess 
institutional leadership. The study found that the heads of academic health centers, 
regardless of title, have powerful jobs. The data also indicate that there is some evidence 
that the scope of their authority and responsibility has expanded in recent years. A recent 
study indicated that most new deans or directors of allied health schools had backgrounds 
in health professions (Layman, Bamberg and Jones, 2002). Clearly, the development of 
leaders is going to be critical to the future of AHCs. Some have called for internal 
leadership training programs at academic health centers to meet this challenge (Morahan, 
et al., 1998). Others have spent considerable energy defining the characteristics that are 
needed for a leader of an AHC to possess including: ability to influence behavior, the 
skills of negotiation, facilitation, conflict management, organizational improvement, 
political savvy, systems thinking, personal mastery, and others (Klauer, Pozehl, and 
Mahaffey, 1997).  
Given the long lists of characteristics in a dean or director, it appears that it may 
be more useful to ask what leadership characteristics we do not want the leaders in AHCs 
to use. A look at leadership from a broader perspective may help. 
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  When considering how academic leadership works, Robert Birnbaum offers 
important insights into some of the myths associated with academic leadership 
(Birnbaum, 1992).  He begins by reviewing the work of Burns (1978) who has attempted 
to differentiate between two forms of leadership, transactional and transformational.  
Transactional leadership depends on the exchange of desired goods between leader and 
follower. The relationship continues as long as the exchange is considered satisfactory for 
both. Transformational leadership emphasizes values and goals such as liberty, justice 
and equality. These ideals motivate followers to support the leader-intended change. 
Thus, transformational leaders are able to introduce advanced and new cultural forms. 
Birnbaum (1992) qualifies transformational leadership by stating that it is an anomaly in 
higher education. When studying college presidents, Birnbaum noted that the good 
presidents synthesized the two approaches. That is, at times they may emphasize 
supporting the status quo and at other times they may need to focus on changing the 
organization. It would appear that this “synergy” of approaches would best serve AHC 
leaders as well, especially during this time of change.  Moreover, the ranges of 
organizational and leadership approaches should reflect the diversity of academic 
institutions. Each must assess its strengths, weaknesses and opportunities as well as 
current and potential threats.  
 As a practical means of determining the effectiveness of a leader, a leadership 
analysis could be conducted every three years (Birnbaum, 1992). The analysis would be 
performed as a case study where a faculty committee would review the actions of the 
leader over that time period. A diagnostic review of the leaders’ actions, leadership style 
and the vision and objectives he/ she has articulated would be conducted. Based upon this 
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information, the committee would then determine if the objectives were met, the vision 
fully or partly realized and the leadership style appropriate and effective to meet the 
identified objectives and vision. A critical evaluation would then be produced with 
recommendations for either continuing on the present course or suggesting modifications 
for the future. 
 However, no matter how well constructed, there is no single acceptable definition 
of leadership or measure of effectiveness. In higher education, views of effective 
leadership vary according to constituency’s levels of analysis and institutional types 
(Bensimon, Neumann and Birbaum, 1989). This premise also applies to AHCs, given the 
diversity of institutional types. 
Followership Theories 
A review of followership theories may also be helpful in understanding the 
leadership dynamics that occurred at Whitman University. Theories of followership are 
based upon the interactions of leaders and those who follow them. Leaders are viewed as 
activators; the followers are the ones being activated (Burns, 1978). The nature of the 
response of activation can best be understood by understanding the context of the 
activation. Situational contexts can influence the interaction between the activator and the 
activated, in this case the dean and the faculty. Charismatic leaders have the greatest 
influence on their followers, who by sheer will and force motivate their followers’ 
actions. (Lundin and Lancaster, 1990). Leaders who positively influence the self-concept 
of followers are the most effective (Brown and Lord, 1999). Followers tend to follow 
charismatic leaders who make the followers feel better about their roles within the 
organization (Haslam and Platow, 2001). Followers who value achievement, have a high 
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need for structure, value internal and external rewards and value security and stability are 
attracted to task-oriented leaders (Earhart and Klein, 2001). Relationship-oriented leaders 
attract followers who value interpersonal relationships, security at work and participative 
decision making (Earhart and Klein, 2001). This type of follower also tends to have low 
self-esteem. They expect the leader to satisfy their need for encouragement and a great 
sense of self-worth (Earhart and Klein, 2001).   
Summary 
The complexities of relationships within academic health centers can be fully 
appreciated only by those with some understanding of the people involved playing out 
perhaps academe’s most intriguing drama (Morris, 1981). Currently, those who are 
responsible for the academic leadership of allied health schools are experiencing difficult 
times and find themselves functioning in a survival-oriented environment. The review of 
the literature indicates that they hold powerful jobs but external influences such as 
managed care and decreasing government funding for the institutions’ academic mission 
are making their positions more complex. Their jobs have become more synergistic in 
nature, demanding the management and business skills of a large corporate entity with 
the professional and academic skills of a scientist and health care provider.  
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Allied Health 
Who and What Are Allied Health Practitioners? 
 In a report discussing the marketing of allied health practitioners, it was pointed 
out that the composition of the allied health profession is a complex question requiring 
more than just a list of professions of what the public would perceive as examples of 
allied health professions (Green, Little, Watson, Warren, Pappas, 1998). Such a list 
would most likely include just about any non-physician or non-nurse health-related 
profession. However, many professions that the public may perceive as allied health 
professions may in fact not consider themselves as fitting in the allied health model. The 
Association of Schools of Allied Health Professions (ASAHP) is a not-for-profit 
organization representing 105 higher education institutions and hundreds of individual 
members who are primarily deans or other administrators and faculty of allied health 
units at four-year colleges (Wilson, 2002). The term “Allied Health” according to the 
ASAHP web site, classifies more than 100 professions providing many services including 
primary care. The ASAHP web site defines allied health professionals in the following 
manner: “Allied Health professionals are involved with the delivery of health or related 
services pertaining to the identification, evaluation and prevention of diseases and 
disorders; dietary and nutrition services; rehabilitation and health systems management, 
among others” (ASAHP, 2006). Additionally, ASAHP describes allied health education 
as being as diverse as the services provided, ranging from hospital-based to university-
based educational programs. 
Allied health professionals fulfill many non-physician and non-nurse functions in 
the delivery of health care services. They make up a significant portion of the healthcare 
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workforce, numbering approximately 2.3 million professionals, about one-third of the 
10.5 million health care workers in the United States.  
The United States is facing a health care workforce crisis in the near future as 
there is an ever-increasing number of patients needing care with a decreasing number of 
qualified allied health professionals to provide that care for them.  Recent reports indicate 
a looming shortage of healthcare workers (Keebe, 2005). A particularly severe shortage 
of medical laboratory workers is expected (Stombler, 2005). Congress, in an attempt to 
address the shortage introduced “The Allied Health Professions Reinvestment Act” in 
2004 H.R.4016 and S.2491 (Stokes, 2004) and re-introduced it in February of 2005 
(Diversity Allied Health Newsletter, 2005).      
What Is the Origin of the Allied Health Professions? 
 Subspecialties of medicine and nursing began to evolve over the past century and 
a half as medical and scientific knowledge advanced (Green, et al. 1998). These areas 
were primarily developed as the evolution of medical care began moving toward 
specialization, creating the need for supportive roles for physicians. Thus, “allied” areas 
of practice emerged with these new practitioners eventually teaching others their 
particular medical subspecialties. The term allied health was popularized in 1967 during 
deliberations that led to the passage of the Allied Health Professions Personnel Training 
Act, 1967 (ASAHP, 2006). Over time, the allied health professions have developed into a 
very diverse and complex collection of subspecialties that the lay public does not 
generally understand or appreciate. 
This professional evolution is what is primarily responsible for two weaknesses 
that are shared by all of the allied health professions: lack of visibility and lack of 
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collaboration. Additionally, the different levels of responsibility and education of 
practitioners compound the allied health identity problem (Green, et. al. 1998).  
Allied Health Education 
When confronted with the diversity and complexity of allied health, the Institute 
of Medicine-National Academy of Sciences (IOM-NAS) Committee to Study the Role of 
Allied Health Personnel reported that because there is no consensus about which 
disciplines constitute allied health, it is hard to define allied health education (Pew Health 
Professions Commission, 1992).  Additionally, the Pew report mentions that allied health 
education occurs at a variety of levels and settings covering a wide scope of certificates 
and degrees awarded at the associate, baccalaureate, and graduate levels. Baccalaureate 
education in allied health is especially diverse, encompassing as many degrees as there 
are professions. Recently, graduate education has evolved to meet the needs of 
professional responsibilities. Moreover, the report states that graduates of programs in the 
allied health sciences account for as many as one out of every six graduates from 
institutions of higher learning listed by the U.S. Department of Education. The Pew 
Commission report also discussed several trends in higher education that affect 
measurably on the allied health professions. These include the shortage of allied health 
faculty. Moreover, the complexity and diversity that is allied health has made it difficult 
to share a broad understanding of allied health, which exacerbates attempts at any policy 
response for the nationwide shortage of these key health care workers. In 2003, the 
Institute of Medicine issued a report that identified the need for a major overhaul in the 
education of the health professions (“Health Professions Education,” 2003). 
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A report published in 2000 described how the Texas higher education system 
gave an extensive look to the future for health professions in Texas. The report was 
commissioned in an attempt to ascertain how well the Texas higher education system 
would be able to meet the needs for health care professionals if current trends and 
patterns continued. Allied health education was specifically studied with some interesting 
results (Rettig, 2000). As it does in many other states, allied health in Texas faces an 
identity problem. The report mentions that many individuals who are otherwise familiar 
with health care remain relatively uninformed about the allied health professions. As a 
primer for policy makers, Dr. Marilyn Harrington, Dean of the School of Allied Health, 
University of Texas, San Antonio and a member of the Health Professions Task Force, 
spoke to the definition of allied health. Interestingly, she characterized allied health 
professionals as not in medicine, not nursing, but more or less the “rest of the gang in 
health care.” 
The Texas report identified several factors that were seen as drivers of change in 
allied health. These included managed care, which results in cost containment pressures 
on employers to hire the lowest paid qualified health professional they can find, and the 
new information technology, which is altering the ways in which health and medical 
services are being provided.  
Moreover, the Texas report identified several national trends affecting allied 
health education. Only eight percent of allied health professionals are educated in 
academic health centers. Of more than 233,000 allied health graduates in the U.S. each 
year, most are educated in four-year institutions (36 %) and community colleges (31 %). 
The diversity of allied health education has created a regulatory nightmare for allied 
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health educators and their parent institutions, including numerous accrediting bodies as 
well as individual licensing boards. This regulatory nightmare is partly due the lack of 
coherence that personifies allied health education. The Texas report identifies nine allied 
health-accrediting bodies, which is very different from nursing or medicine. The most 
comprehensive of the allied health accrediting bodies is the Commission on Accreditation 
for Allied Health Education Programs (CAAHEP) that represents 18 different allied 
health professions and over 2,000 different institutions and programs. CAAHEP was 
created in response to the American Medical Association’s withdrawal from accrediting 
allied health programs.  
 “Degree creep” was identified by the Texas report as a current concern. Some of 
the allied health professions were seen as steadily raising their degree requirements. 
Some have gone so far as to require the doctorate for entry level into the profession, 
influencing the program’s entry level requirements (“The Clinical Doctorate,” 2005). The 
report mentions that while there may be some rationale for increasing degree 
requirements due to growing scientific and technological knowledge, most requests for 
new doctoral programs are not accompanied by a compelling educational or health 
rationale. Making such abrupt changes in degree requirements dramatically increases the 
state’s cost per student. 
 In summary, the report concluded that without a more comprehensive information 
base, policy makers would be faced with a fragmented, piecemeal and incremental 
approach to addressing the issues around allied health education. They would also be 
dealing primarily with very specific and highly localized considerations. A more broad-
based approach is simply not possible, which is unfortunate considering that the 
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importance of allied health professionals to the future of health care will only increase 
because of the pressures of cost containment on health care in the future. 
Allied Health Education Accreditation 
 A recent report affirms accreditation as an effective system for assuring 
the quality of allied health programs (Baker, Morrone, and Gable, 2004). Others have 
reported a disassociation between accrediting bodies and those they intend to serve 
(Koehneke, 2003).  
Accreditation cost was one of the issues under discussion at the second annual 
summer retreat sponsored by the Association of Academic Health Centers (AHC) and the 
Federation of Associations of Schools of the Health Professions (FASHP) (Cocolas and 
Rubin, 1991). Accreditation was considered by many to be an educational issue that has 
the tendency to be the most politicized as many of the health professions continue to 
expand their scope of practice. The discussions at the retreat identified several concerns 
shared by allied health educators, including the continued fragmentation and prescriptive 
nature of the accrediting process, barriers to innovation and experimentation, and the 
changing role of government in the process. Generally, the accreditation process is a self-
regulatory activity created by the academic and professional education communities. 
Non-governmental associations of institutions, programs and professionals in the 
particular fields administer accreditation. Regional or institutional accrediting agencies 
establish the guidelines for institutional accreditation.  
 At the summer retreat allied health participants expounded on the costs of 
accreditation and the growing conflict of programmatic versus school accreditation. 
Moreover, participants even questioned the use of accreditation as a measure of quality of 
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education. An important dilemma concerning accreditation is the impact of multiple 
levels of accrediting agencies on the institution, requiring different types and 
presentations of data. Allied health programs are seriously encumbered by what was 
described as the costly maze of accreditation requirements put upon the schools by the 
many associations making up this “conglomerate of health professions.” With 
biotechnology spawning new careers and professions, Cocalas and Rubin, (1991) predict 
that in the future the situation will only worsen unless the accreditation process becomes 
more flexible.  In the future, greater collaboration between professional organizations and 
professional educational institutions will be essential in creating a more cost effective and 
rational approach to accreditation. 
 More recently, accreditation was identified to still be of major concern with 
several issues still problematic including accreditation costs, program structures and a 
common self study format (“Accreditation Remains a Concern,” 2005). In 1999 the Task 
Force on Accreditation of Health Professions Education issued a report titled: Strategies 
for Change and Improvement (Gelman, O’Neil, and Kimmey, 1999). The task force 
identified four major accreditation issues: the need for a more simplified process, the 
development of an accreditation process that focuses on improvement, generic 
benchmarks and closer links with customers and clients.  
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So What Should a Good School of Allied Health Look Like? 
 Schools of allied health professions have been described as complex structures 
composed of multiple professional programs. (Blayney and Rogers, 1980). In terms of 
cultural diversity, a recent study found that 82% of students are white compared to 97% 
of the faculty (Velde, Wittman, and Bamberg, 2003). Blayney and Rogers conducted a 
fascinating study in response to the need for the School Community of Alabama (SCAH) 
and the University of Alabama in Birmingham (UAB) to develop both their short- and 
long-term goals toward achieving and maintaining excellence. They assembled a panel of 
six experts and five deans of schools of allied health professions from the southeastern 
United States and a representative from the Kellogg foundation. Their primary objective 
was to identify the characteristics of outstanding schools of allied health and thus assist 
the SCAH and UAB in developing short- and long-term plans for achieving excellence. A 
questionnaire was developed consisting of 47 traits that the panel considered 
characteristic of an outstanding school of allied health. The questionnaire was then 
mailed to each panel member for completion using a five-point scale. The final analysis 
of the questionnaire by the expert panel indicated that 43 of the 47 characteristics were 
good indicators of an outstanding school of allied health. The questionnaire was then 
used to survey allied health deans who were identified on a list supplied by the National 
Commission on Allied Health Education. The return rate for the questionnaire was 
49.2%. Generally, there seemed to be a tendency for all the respondents to rate all 
characteristics as high. However, there was a marked tendency for internal concerns to be 
more important than external concerns such as research and service. Most of the 
emphasis was on good school leadership and producing quality graduates.  
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Summary 
 Allied health educators and professionals are only two of many players in today’s 
academic health center, which includes physicians, nurses and others, all with 
fundamental differences in their backgrounds. The evolution of allied health careers into 
a very diverse and complex collection of sub-specialties has created an identity issue for 
the professions since the public generally doesn’t understand who or what the allied 
health professions are. Moreover, the literature also indicates that allied health education 
is as diverse as the services provided. Educational venues for allied health education 
range from hospital-based to university-based programs.  
 To address this identity issue, most academic health centers formed schools or 
other organizational units to give these groups a common identity and voice. Whitman 
University was no exception, forming the Division of Allied Health Sciences in the 
School of Medicine, the forerunner of what was later to be known as the School of Allied 
Health Sciences.  
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Organizational Aspects of Colleges and Universities 
A review of how colleges and universities are organized and how they operate is 
fundamental to understanding the complex organizational aspects of the Whitman 
University SAHS. While sharing some organizational structure common to most colleges 
and universities such as hierarchical leadership where the dean had the top administrative 
position, the SAHS was peculiar in some aspects, the notion of the SAHS being a school 
within the School of Medicine being the most obvious. 
“Intelligence Evolves” 
 When considering the evolution of the university as an organization, the quote 
above from Morgan (1996) comes to mind. Duryea (2000) describes the evolution of 
university organization as a “complicated process by which the cultures mingle over a 
history fraught with traditions and happenstance”. Organizationally, Duryea (2000) 
indicates that the form and function of the university organization was stabilized by the 
onset of World War I. The use of the corporate form with lay governing boards goes back 
into the nineteenth century. Organizational expansion and consolidation mark the 
twentieth century with its associated evidence of dysfunction. The “multiversity” (Lucas, 
1996) stands as the ultimate outcome of the modern day university organization, resulting 
in what Duryea describes as three pervasive organizational inadequacies. The first is 
attributed to size and complexity, the second to departmentalization and the third to 
shifting patterns of institutional governance. By becoming large bureaucracies, colleges 
and universities have had to create a hierarchy of departments, schools, and councils with 
numerous associated committees. The different attitudes and values associated with these 
have driven a psychological wedge between faculty members and administrators. The 
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department as an organizational unit is the second evidence of dysfunction. Specialization 
has produced a tendency toward fragmentation in the academy. This commitment 
towards specialization acts as a centrifugal force pushing faculty loyalties out from the 
university. This fragmentation contributes to the third problem of the shifting of power in 
universities, the diffusion of governance. The diffusion of governance to departments, 
administrative offices and faculty governing boards, along with the intrusion of external 
forces has generally bypassed presidents and boards. Therefore, Duryea states that 
colleges and universities are now being governed by “confederations of largely 
autonomous departments” characterized by Shils (1983) as “the hole in the centre.” 
Universities as Organisms 
Colleges and universities are complex, open systems hierarchical in structure. For 
example, the schools that function within the university represent a variety of 
organizational subsystems that are still integrated within the whole; thus, the variety of 
subsystems is an example of diversification. Morgan’s (1996) metaphorical 
representation of organizations as organisms provides an excellent model for 
understanding the university in a holistic fashion and is particularly relevant to   
understanding the SAHS.  Universities are complex systems comprised of sets of 
interacting subsystems of many varieties allowing for adaptation. There is mutual 
dependence and interactiveness between the university and its environment; this is both 
reactive and proactive. The university has different levels of needs, and in satisfying each 
level, the university develops itself. Universities work to maintain stability and ensure 
their survival. They also remain the same but change in terms of form and function in 
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order to adapt successfully. A university can be thought of as a kaleidoscope of patterns, 
processes, and systems that allows it to adapt to its changing environment.  
Universities as Political and Social Systems 
Universities may be viewed as political systems (Morgan, 1996). The political 
model characterizes universities as organizations comprised of loose networks of people 
with divergent interests who gather for the sake of expediency. Members of the university 
community become organizational political actors. They understand the political 
significance of the patterns of meaning enacted in the university’s culture and subculture. 
Moreover, the university culture may be the driving organizational influence on some 
campuses; accordingly, the political players have a shared reality of a common set of 
norms, values and ideas.  
Clark (1985) describes two paradigms in organizational theory and research that 
have relevance to university organizational models. He reports on Getzel and Guba’s 
model that describes organizations as social systems. The model proposes a social system 
that consists of two dimensions: the institution with its roles and role expectations (the 
organizational dimension) and individuals with their own personalities and needs. The 
social behavior of the organization derives from the interaction of the two dimensions. 
The second paradigm is a formal bureaucratic structure with specific offices, job 
descriptions, and goals. During the 1960s and 1970s this model received widespread 
attention in educational administration. The bureaucratic paradigm was challenged by 
contingency theorists such as Lawrence and Lorsch (Scott 1981), who argued that there is 
no best way to organize and manage. Different strategies and tactics will work depending 
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on the goals of the university and whether the task is simple or complex. Thus, the 
structural heterogeneity of the organization affects the process. 
Tierney (1991) proposes two interesting questions often asked by even seasoned 
college and university administrators. Is it mission, values, and bureaucratic procedures 
or strong personalities that hold this place together? How does this place run and what 
does it expect from its leaders?  Understanding the organizational culture of the 
institution, in his view, is the most important job of institutional leaders. Cultural 
influences occur at many levels--departmental, institutional, and state. They can all vary 
dramatically. Therefore, understanding the organizational culture is critical to minimizing 
the occurrences and consequences of cultural conflict, thus reducing the potential of 
adversarial relationships. Culture should play a major role in decision making. 
Understanding the institutional culture will also help leaders understand why different 
groups in the university hold varying perceptions when it comes to institutional 
performance.  
Moreover, Tierney (2000) addresses the recent cultural trend of educational 
institutions being viewed as business organizations, mentioning that they should not be 
assessed on an analysis of profit margin. He goes on to exclaim that, “we should not lose 
sight of what education is.” Students are not “markets to be tapped or products to be 
improved.” (p. 547) 
Organizations as “Loosely Coupled Systems” 
Weick (2000) examines educational organizations as “loosely coupled systems” 
(p. 36). He uses this image to convey the notion that coupled events are responsive but 
that each preserves its own identity and physical or logical separateness. He goes on to 
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say that in terms of organizational structure, loose coupling carries connotations of 
impermanence, dissolvability and tacitness, which are all properties of what holds an 
organization together. It also suggests the idea of building blocks that can work together 
in an organization with little disturbance to each other. However, loose coupling has the 
potential in educational organizations to accentuate the loose coupling between the 
intentions and actions of organizational members. As a result, administrators may 
become baffled and angered when things never seem to happen the way they are 
supposed to. Weick identifies several strengths and potential functions for the loose 
coupling organizational model in educational institutions. Loose coupling allows for the 
organization to be able to respond to each little change in the environment that may 
occur. It also provides a sensitive sensing mechanism, allowing for the organization to 
know its environment better than a tightly coupled system. This also allows for localized 
organizational adaptation. Identity, uniqueness and separation of elements of the 
organization are preserved. The system can also retain a greater number of mutations and 
novel solutions than a more tightly coupled system. A breakdown in the system would be 
confined to a specific part of the system’s not affecting the other portions of the 
organization. Self-determination of the actors is better accomplished in a loosely coupled 
system. This aspect is important in colleges and universities where professional 
autonomy is highly valued. A more loosely coupled system takes less time and money to 
coordinate. Thus, it would be relatively less expensive than one more tightly coupled.  
Professionalism in Academic Organizations 
Professionalism is another important characteristic of an academic organization 
wherein the institution hires professionals who are expertly trained for specific tasks. 
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However, professionalism can also impede the function of the institution. Professionals 
demand autonomy in their work and freedom from supervision. They tend to have 
divided loyalties and there are often strong tensions between professional values and 
bureaucratic expectations. They also demand peer review of their work. This creates a 
tendency for academic organizations to have fragmented professional staffs.  
Environmental Influences on Organizations 
Environmental vulnerability is another characteristic that distinguishes academic 
organizations from many other complex organizations. On the continuum from being 
“independent” to “captured” by their environments, colleges and universities are 
somewhere in the middle. Recently powerful external forces have been applied to 
academic organizations. This external pressure reduces the autonomy of academic 
professionals. Colleges and universities are steadily losing ground to external forces. As 
they become more vulnerable, their governance patterns change significantly. Baldridge 
(2000) summarizes this discussion by characterizing universities according to the term 
suggested by Cohen and March (2000) that they are best described as “organized 
anarchy” that is, a system with little organization or control. 
Decision Making 
“Rational decision making is generally conceded to be a normative ideal, but not 
susceptible to practice” (Chaffee, 1991). 
Chaffee (1991) describes rational decision making as it applies to university 
budgeting as being comprised of four criteria: goals, alternatives, consequences, and the 
selection of those circumstances (choice) whose consequences rank highest among the 
decision maker’s values. This approach is based upon the fact that each decision has a 
 32 
rule by which one alternative is chosen rather than another. The principal elements that 
should enter into the criteria for goals include academic importance, student interest, 
possibility for excellence and funding potential. The second criterion (alternatives) in the 
rational process would simultaneously consider a wide array of spending alternatives, the 
key elements being “simultaneously” and “wide array”. The evidence for simultaneous 
decisions is unequivocal according to Chaffee, since administrators generally have a wide 
variety of alternatives available to them. The third criterion (consequences) is related to 
the quality of information administrators have available in the decision making process. It 
should be sufficient to allow them to relate their preferences through some understanding 
of the causes and effects. When well informed of the consequences of their decisions, 
administrators are in good positions to choose rationally. The final criterion (choice) 
would follow a reasonable confirmation of the first three criteria, resulting in a regression 
equation of the following form: 
Decision result = preference (1) + preference (2) + ….+ preference (n) 
The preference list of variables would include and be consistent with the administrators’ 
goals of academic importance, student interest, possibility for excellence and funding 
potential. Chaffee (1991) concludes that rational reasons for rejecting a request in this 
context would be seen by most of the university community as reasonable and fair. 
However, while a rational process is suitable, it is probably neither normative nor 
unrealistic in most contexts. It should be part of a multifaceted approach to decision 
making in most institutions, since the entire budgeting process doesn’t lend itself to a 
single desired model. 
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Client Services 
 Decision making in health care organizations is heavily influenced by clients. 
Client service is another important characteristic of the university. Universities are 
“people processing” institutions. Clients with specific needs are fed into the institution 
and returned back to the larger society. Therefore client voices have a significant input 
and often play a significant role in the decision making process. Additionally, serving 
clients with disparate, complicated needs is also difficult. Therefore, the technology 
needed by a client-serving organization is difficult to identify. Manufacturing 
organizations can develop specific technology for their needs but a client-serving 
organization oftentimes does not know clearly what it is trying to do or how to get it 
done.  
Garbage Cans, Pigeonholes and Loosely Coupled Systems 
Cohen and March (2000) utilized a “garbage can” metaphor as a means to 
understanding the processes within organizations. Problems and solutions are dumped by 
participants into a single garbage can. The single can represents not only what was 
deposited into the single can but it also represents what garbage was being produced at 
the moment and the speed at which the garbage was being collected and removed. Thus, 
they use the garbage can metaphor to describe a situation where a decision is an outcome 
of several different streams within an organization. The streams they identify are 
problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. Thus, if one considers 
universities to be organized anarchies, as described above, the garbage can idea of 
decision making may become particularly appropriate to decision making in higher 
education, according to Cohen and March. Colleges and universities are generally 
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described as operating under the metaphors of a political system or hierarchical 
bureaucracy. However, the actual operation of the academy is considerably attenuated by 
an ambiguity of goals, lack of clarity and the transitory character of the participants. The 
great advantage of recognizing the garbage can process is that decision makers can have 
some sense of understanding the process along with making some attempt to manage it. 
Alone, the garbage can process does not do a particularly good job of resolving problems 
but it does enable some choices to be made and some problems to be solved.   
Professional Bureaucracies 
The professional bureaucracy relies on the standardization of skills, training and 
indoctrinated specialists and professionals for its decision making core (Mintzberg, 
2000). The SAHS at Whitman University organizationally possessed some of the 
characteristics identified in a professional bureaucracy as described below. Essentially 
bureaucratic, these organizations are characterized by technostructure designs 
emphasizing authority of a professional nature or expertise. The set of skills the 
professionals hold are applied to predetermined situations or contingencies. The 
professional has two basic tasks: to identify the client’s needs and to execute a 
predetermined program for each situation. People are characterized and placed into a 
specific decision making situation based upon their expertise and professional nature. 
Mintzberg describes this process as “pigeonholing.” This simplifies the decision making 
process by creating a highly decentralized structure.  Categories of problems are 
addressed by professionals skilled in the arena of the problem. This saves considerable 
resources. Each decision would be addressed only by those professionals who possess the 
required expertise. However, this type of organizational structure produces stereotypes 
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and requires categorization of the problems that require decisions.  It also reduces the 
power of the central administration, which primarily is left to address disturbances in the 
structure. The difficulty in applying the professional bureaucracy to an academic 
institution is that while the knowledge base of the institution is sophisticated, the 
technical system or how the professional expertise would be applied is not. Additionally, 
the pigeonholing process itself can produce a great deal of conflict as a continual 
reassessment of contingencies and who has the expertise to address them would be 
ongoing, resulting in a political quagmire.  
“Organizations Are Emotional Arenas” 
 Fineman (1993), quoted above, emphasizes the fact that what people do with their 
feelings at work plays a large part in shaping the essence of their organization. Feelings 
contribute to, and reflect, the structure and culture of organizations (Fineman, 1993). 
 He points out that people have personal needs, goals, skills and preferences that will 
collide, collaborate, resist and comply in ways that make organizational life messy. The 
social construction of organizations is intensely subjective and personal. Work 
organizations are sites where individuals make meaning for themselves. There is nowhere 
this applies more than in colleges and universities. Fineman identifies several studies 
where loss of identity and reason for living have resulted when one loses a job 
unexpectedly. He defines “emotional labor” as a term used to describe the way roles and 
tasks exert overt and covert control over emotional displays. He goes on to say that it is 
through recruitment, selection, socialization, and performance evaluations that 
organizations develop a social reality in which feelings become a commodity for 
achieving instrumental goals. Emotional labor is ex
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employees are asked to express emotions that contradict their inner feelings. 
Additionally, emotions ignite creativity, spiritual development, and contribute to the 
development of community. Fineman concludes that emotions play a vital role in 
organizational life. Organizations should be shaped by emotionally centered creativity 
and mutual understanding as necessary elements for human growth. 
 When examining high faculty morale and what exemplary colleges do right, Rice 
and Austin (1991) found several key characteristics in the ten liberal arts colleges they 
researched that had high scores in faculty satisfaction and morale. A distinctive 
organizational culture was present in each of them. Factors making up this distinctive 
culture included campus rituals, a distinctive architecture, and a focus on students, along 
with a concept of community. Participatory leadership was prevalent on all of these 
campuses where the campus leadership was aggressively participatory and faculty felt 
very much a part of the decision making climate. Interestingly, in this same cohort, strong 
deans were given credit for holding colleges together in difficult times. Presidents and 
deans in these colleges know how to empower others. They share authority, and in doing 
so, enhance the effectiveness of their organizations. Information is shared willingly and a 
respect for faculty and a sense of trust permeates these institutions. Faculty leadership in 
these institutions was found to be a “structural phenomenon”.  All of these factors 
contribute to an organizational momentum shared by each of the ten institutions creating 
a sense of these campuses being “on the move.” Thus, the strong sense of community 
created an environment that fostered collaboration and focused support, not competition. 
Rice and Austin conclude by stating that the satisfaction of the faculty is critical to the 
achievement of educational goals.  
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Summary 
 In describing characteristics of academic organizations, Baldridge (2000) focuses 
on five distinguishing features. Universities in general are described as complex 
organizations similar to other organizations in that they have goals, hierarchical systems, 
structures and officials who are the decision makers and carry out specific duties. 
However, they also exhibit critical distinguishing characteristics that set them apart. 
Universities have goals that are usually vague, and ambiguous. The decision making 
process is fraught with a high degree of ambiguity, uncertainty and conflict. Therefore, 
goal ambiguity is one of the chief characteristics of academic organizations. 
It is within this ambiguous milieu that the Whitman University SAHS found itself 
in 1999. This study will utilize the literature discussed in this section as a lens for 
establishing a mechanism for the analysis of the organizational changes the school 
experienced during a reorganization process. 
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Chapter 3:  Data Collection and Analysis 
An in-depth investigation of the SAHS will serve as the core of inquiry, forming  
the premises for a case study exploring the phenomena surrounding the reorganization of 
the school. Three distinct theoretical structural categories will be used to study the 
reorganization of the school, to guide the data collection and analysis, and to keep the 
study within feasible limits: internal forces, external forces and leadership. 
Data Collection Strategies 
Three phases of data collection, each relying upon a different source of evidence, 
occurred in this study utilizing qualitative methods as described by Yin (1994). The 
rationale for using three sources of evidence is that while the sources are complementary, 
they can be triangulated, thus enhancing the trustworthiness of the overall results. 
Additionally, triangulation allows for the potential of creating unique insights into the 
data unobtainable with either one alone. The data collection was accomplished in three 
phases. Phases I and II used the qualitative research methods of participant observation 
and document analysis. Phase I focused on an analysis of all documents considered 
potentially helpful in identifying the themes or trends throughout the school’s history that 
contributed to its failure.  Phase II was conducted in real time allowing for contextual 
coverage of the events while allowing for insights into interpersonal behavior and 
motives (participant observation). Phase III used the results of Phases I and II in the 
development of open-ended questions for interviews to be conducted with key players 
identified in Phases I and II of the data collection. The document analysis and participant 
observation in Phases I and II generated a list of topics about which it would be important 
to collect additional information from the perspectives of key actors. Initially, a collection 
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of potential interview questions was drafted that was examined for consistency with the 
results of Phases I and II data collection. From these, the final interview questions were 
developed. Phase III served as a means to check the trustworthiness of the themes 
identified in Phases I and II, and potentially to identify new insights into the data.  
Cumulatively, this strategy allowed for the completion of a chain of evidence for 
each structural category, thus assuring the reliability of the results.  
Methods 
Document Analysis 
 
For this case study, documents will be used in conjunction with the other sources 
of data collection, observation and interviews, to produce a consistent picture of the 
factors leading to the school’s reorganization. Ready access to the documents was 
obtained by the professional relationship of the researcher to the school and through 
individuals outside the school with an interest in the research. Documents along with 
related notes were filed according to the categories below in chronological order. 
Categorizing the documents in this fashion allows for a reduction of bias in interpreting 
the data. Understanding that each communication between parties was to achieve another 
objective or some purpose other than the case study helped prevent being misled by the 
contents of the documents. Constantly identifying these conditions showed appreciation 
for their usefulness.  
A listing of the documents obtained and their categorization is included as part of 
the study’s database delineated in Table 1. 
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Table 1 
 
Database 
Documents 
 
Letters, Memoranda and Email 
 
1. Communications between faculty and SAHS administration 
 
2. Communications between faculty 
 
3. Faculty Council and University Administration communications with the SAHS 
 
Committee Meeting Minutes, Agendas, Announcements and Reports 
 
1. School Executive Committee 
 
2. School Coordinating Council 
 
3. Hospital Consolidation Committees 
 
4. SAHS faculty meetings 
 
5. University Faculty Council  
 
SAHS Administrative Documents 
 
1. SAHS Strategic Plan 
2. School enrollment reports 
3. Program annual reports 
4. Other internal documents 
 
Formal Studies or Evaluations of the SAHS 
 
1. External Advisory Committee Report 
2. SAHS Economic Modeling Report 
3. Faculty Council Report 
4. Five Year Evaluation of the Dean 
 41 
Mass Media 
 
1. Newspaper articles 
2. Departmental and campus wide newsletters 
 
Archival Records 
 
1. Organizational Charts 
2. Budget Records 
3. Survey Data 
Case Study Notes 
 
1. Results of Interviews 
2. Observations 
3. Document Analysis 
Participant Observation Narrative 
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Participant Observation Narrative 
The researcher as a faculty member in the SAHS assumed a variety of roles 
within the case study, from passive observer to a participant in the events leading to the 
school’s reorganization and the leadership analysis that followed. This allowed for the 
researcher to gain access to events and groups that would be otherwise inaccessible while 
providing the distinctive insight of being within the case study rather than outside looking 
in. For this case study, the ability of the investigator to provide an accurate accounting of 
the events surrounding the case study phenomenon is very important in producing an 
accurate portrayal of the school’s reorganization.  
Data collection from the participant observations was formalized by the 
researcher in a narrative whereby the researcher composed answers to the open-ended 
questions used during the interview phase of the data collection. Yin describes this 
process as an analytical one and an important part of the case study analysis. He describes 
the format for the answers as analogous to that of a “take home” exam used in graduate 
degree programs, whereby the investigator is the respondent. Using relevant evidence 
including documents, observations, archival evidence and interviews, the researcher 
composed what he felt to be an adequate answer. The main purpose of the answers was to 
document the connection between the themes identified by participant observation and 
the other phases of data collection. The set of answers became part of the case study 
database.   
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Identified biases. 
Inherent in this type of data collection are the preexisting biases that accompany 
this type of observation. Listed below are three potential biases for this phase of data 
collection. 
1. The researcher has less ability to work as an external observer. 
2. The researcher could become a supporter of a group or idea within the case. 
3. The participant role may not allow the researcher enough attention to the observer 
role. 
 
Being aware of and articulating these biases was important in reminding the      
researcher of the potential dangers relative to this type of research. Moreover, the 
researcher used reflective notes and outside criticism as important means to ensure good 
scientific practice.  
Interviews 
The primary purpose of the interviews was to corroborate the themes identified in 
the document analysis and the participant observations. Open-ended interviews were 
conducted with key respondents (Table 2). The open-ended interview allowed for the 
respondents not only to answer the interviewer’s questions but also to express their 
opinions about events. Additionally, the respondents’ insights into the events surrounding 
the school’s reorganization yielded further areas for inquiry. The interview questions 
were formulated based upon the results of the Phase I and II data analysis and are 
attached as Appendix A. 
The interviewer recorded the responses of the informants during the interview 
with reflective notes included afterward. Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter and 
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the importance of the respondents’ feeling free to provide their insights, other methods 
for recording responses including tape recordings were not used.   
Identified biases. 
Interviews, being verbal reports, are often subject to bias, including poor recall or 
inaccurate articulation. The corroboration of the interviewee’s responses with other data 
sources assisted in the elimination of many of these common problems but likely did not 
eliminate them entirely. 
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Table 2 
 
Interview List 
One Faculty Member from Each of the Following SAHS Programs 
 
Occupational Therapy 
Physical Therapy 
Clinical Laboratory Science 
Radiologic Sciences 
Respiratory Therapy 
Health Sciences Education 
 
SAHS Administration and Staff 
 
Dean 
Director of Student Affairs 
 
Sources External to the SAHS 
 
Previous Dean (1991-1995) 
External Advisory Committee Member 
University Campus Administrator 
Economic Modeling Professional 
Note.    The interviewees were selected based upon the following criteria:  they should have been faculty members throughout the 
school’s history and they should reflect the diversity of the school’s programmatic structure. Individuals outside the school familiar 
with its history were also interviewed.   
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Data Analysis/Interpretation and Method of Reporting 
 The case study database consisted of case study notes, documents, tabular 
materials and the participant observation narrative (Table 1). The themes identified from 
the three Phases of data collection served as structural categories for the study. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, the conceptual framework for the data analysis linked these themes 
to the three structural categories that played a role in the reorganization of the school: 
internal forces, external forces and leadership. Further themes within each structural 
category were then identified. The convergence in triangulating fashion of the three 
phases of data collection established trustworthiness. “Pattern matching” was used to link 
related pieces of information to the three structural categories. Categorizing the data in 
this fashion allowed for the creation of a chain of evidence for each structural category 
with clear cross-referencing to methodological procedures and resulting evidence.  
 The specific criteria for the interpretation of the results evolved with the emerging 
research design guided by a theoretical framework of organizational theories. Data 
collection and analysis are summarized in Figure 1. 
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                                           Document Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interviews  
 Participant 
                                                                                                                       Observation 
 
 
 
 
  
Structural Categories 
 
 
 External Forces 
              Internal Forces 
                                                              Leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Data Collection and Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
                      FACTS 
Thematic Categories 
       Discussion and Summary 
        Organizational Theories 
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Mechanisms for Establishing Trustworthiness and Treatment of Ethics 
  This case study, being a controversial topic, requires that the names of the entire 
case and its participants be disguised. Moreover, the publication of this case report may 
affect the later actions of those who were studied. Thus, maintaining anonymity is an 
important mechanism for ensuring trustworthiness. Additionally, as part of a 
trustworthiness procedure, drafts of the case study were not only read by peers but also 
by participants and informants in the case as a means of corroborating the evidence 
presented in the case.  Any disagreement over the facts or evidence was addressed 
through further dialogue and research. This process, which increased the construct 
validity of the study, enhanced the accuracy of the report.  
 The use of rival structural categories also contributed to the trustworthiness of the 
study by allowing for the consideration of alternative perspectives when doing the data 
analysis and interpretation. This reduced the potential for biased support of a particular 
point of view. 
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Chapter 4:  Results 
Introduction 
 The reorganization of the SAHS was a two-year process involving multiple 
procedural steps with complex manifestations, as outlined in the timeline in Appendix B. 
Moreover, the SAHS was comprised of a diverse collection of programs as illustrated in 
the organizational chart in Appendix C. These details will be summarized below. 
Following this overview, this chapter presents the themes from the data collection, 
organized by the three major forces at play in this case: internal, external, and leadership. 
Brief Historical Overview 
The Whitman University School of Allied Health Sciences was a fiscal unit of the 
Whitman University School of Medicine (SOM) and provided both pre-baccalaureate and 
post- baccalaureate education.  The Bachelor of Science degree was first conferred by the 
faculty of the School of Medicine in 1960, to be given to those students successfully 
completing the curriculum in four allied health programs. These programs had been 
offered long before the establishment of the “Division” of Allied Health Sciences within 
the School of Medicine in 1959. In 1991 the Division of Allied Health Sciences was 
given school status by the university but within the SOM. 
It was one of the oldest allied health academic units in the country and enjoyed 
 
a national reputation for excellence. The SAHS was non-departmental, but rather was 
comprised of 12 program areas and three administrative support units. 
The Dean of the School of Medicine was at the top of the organizational structure 
for the SAHS and functioned as the administrative head.  However, all practical 
administration of the SAHS was delegated to the Dean of the SAHS. The last SAHS 
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Dean’s administrative staff was composed of three individuals; the Associate Dean of 
Student and Academic Affairs, the Associate Dean of Research and Graduate Students, 
and a business manager.  The school’s Executive Committee, composed of the school’s 
program directors, formed the administrative leadership of the school. The program 
directors, of each of twelve areas of concentration for the various allied health programs 
offered by the SAHS served on the Executive Committee.   
 Prior to the first year of the reorganization process that is the topic of this study, 
concern and discussion about the school’s financial and academic conditions began. 
Enrollment shifts, accreditation issues and hospital consolidations that were affecting the 
school were taking place. To address these changing conditions and others, the Dean met 
with the faculty and recommended that an Ad Hoc Faculty/ Administrative Committee be 
formed to commence the process of economic modeling and subsequently to make 
recommendations to the school on how to address these issues. Toward the end stages of 
this process the Dean (SAHS) submitted a statement of financial difficulty to the Dean of 
the SOM and to the campus chancellor. Following the submission of the financial 
difficulty statement, the school requested from central administration a campus 
reallocation of $500,000 to address the school’s immediate financial problems.  
Upon submitting the statement of financial difficulty to the campus, the 
procedural steps for the campus’s newly approved policy entitled; Whitman University 
Policy on Transfer, Merger, Reorganization, Reduction and Elimination of Academic 
Programs (PTMR), set the stage for the next steps. One of the first of these steps was the 
establishment of an Ad Hoc External Advisory Committee, which would be charged with 
the task of making recommendations concerning the current resources available to the 
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school and the school’s ability to support the existing structure. The external advisory 
committee’s conclusions were similar to those of the SAHS Ad Hoc Economic Modeling 
Committee in determining that the financial resources available to the school were not 
adequate to support the existing array of programs. After meeting with the SAHS 
Executive Committee and completing a widespread information gathering effort, the 
Dean distributed a draft academic and budgeting plan to the SAHS faculty and the deans 
of schools of related programs. After allowing for feedback from all communities of 
interest, the Dean submitted his final proposal to the Dean of the SOM, campus 
chancellor, SAHS faculty, and to the Executive Committee of the campus’s Faculty 
Council. 
 Following the submission of the Dean’s plan, the Faculty Council began its 
review process, which involved hearings with the SAHS faculty and campus-wide 
hearings with the SAHS’s communities of interest. After all hearings and information 
gathering efforts were accomplished, the Faculty Council met to review the Dean’s 
reorganization proposal. Initially, the Dean’s proposal was rejected by the Faculty 
Council but after suggested revisions were made, the proposal was submitted to the 
Chancellor along with Faculty Council’s recommendations and other information for the 
Chancellor to consider for a final recommendation. The Chancellor’s final determination 
was to accept the Dean’s proposal. After the Chancellor’s acceptance of the Dean’s 
proposal, the SAHS was reorganized into the School of Health and Rehabilitation 
Sciences, where four of the programs remained (Physical Therapy, Occupational 
Therapy, Health Sciences Education and Nutrition and Dietetics). The other programs 
were moved to other academic units as illustrated in Appendix D. 
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The immediate chain of events that is the focus of this study all occurred between 
1999 and 2001. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
 As previously discussed, data were derived from three sources: document 
analysis, interviews, and participant observation. Data analysis was facilitated by the use 
of Access database software (Microsoft Corporation). The database was comprised of 
410 data entries derived from 12 interviews, 18 documents and the participant 
observation. The data entries were categorized by location, participant type, structural 
categories, themes and sub themes, along with text segments that were coded according 
to the data sources and taxonomy table in Appendix D. Due to the sensitive nature of the 
subject matter, the source of the quotations from the interviewees are presented in generic 
form, e.g. “faculty quote.” This is necessary to guarantee the anonymity of the source. 
Additionally, italics and center spacing are sometimes used to add emphasis to the quoted 
words.   
 As indicated in the research questions, three major structural categories of interest 
frame this study: leadership, internal, and external forces. The leadership of the school 
was found to be the dominant structural category in the school’s reorganization. The 
other structural categories, internal and external forces, were also contributing factors but 
were a distant second to leadership’s role. Each of these structural categories will be 
discussed below, beginning with external forces. 
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External Forces: “The consolidated hospital ditched our people and didn’t provide the 
$220K base needed to cover their salaries.” 
 Economic themes were the overriding topic of the External Forces structural 
category. Subthemes such as, Responsibility Center Management, the reaction of the 
SOM, and Physical Therapy (PT) accreditation were also identified. Moreover, early in 
the reorganization process an External Advisory Committee was formed as an 
independent body to make recommendations to the SAHS. As indicated by the excerpt 
below from the SAHS Dean’s reorganization plan, the committee offered important 
insights into how the process would unfold. 
 
“An External Advisory Committee, formed through collaborative appointments with key 
segments of the university, studied the school in the spring of 2001 and in a most 
insightful and futuristic way recommended a set of strategies and principles for academic 
and budgetary reconciliation.” 
 
The role of the university’s higher administration was also mentioned and 
centered on its role in advocating and supporting the SAHS dean’s plan. 
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Responsibility Center Management 
 Responsibility Center Management (RCM) was mentioned as a subtheme with 
most of the comments indicating the perception from the faculty that the SAHS was 
initially underfunded. 
 
“RCM had the school underfunded initially, a problem that goes back to the 70s” 
 
“RCM initially underfunded, no SAHS involvement with RCM funding, out of loop.” 
 
“SAHS is a quasi-responsibility center (RC) within the SOM. The description as a quasi-
RC is based on the fact that the SAHS has a separate and distinct budget with state 
appropriations.” 
 
The Ad Hoc External Advisory Committee report identified the SAHS a “quasi-
responsibility center” within the SOM. The descriptive term “quasi” was based upon the 
fact that the SAHS had a separate and distinct budget within the SOM. Ideally, 
responsibility centers (RC) are designed to allow for each RC to determine its own 
economic plan based upon its own academic mission and needs. However, under their 
existing structure the SAHS faculty never had the opportunity to fully realize the RC 
ideal. State appropriations were tied to tenure track positions with tuition dollars being 
the primary source of revenue for the rest of the school’s operation. There was a 
widespread perception that the school had been significantly underfunded from the 
beginning. The school’s past dean summarized the RC problem in this way, “RCM was a 
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complicating factor…we were gaining resources as enrollment went up but we gained 
expenses… [through such events as the] hospital merger…PT at a nearby sports facility 
and the badly needed renovation of classroom/lab space in the residence hall.” It was the 
SOM that determined the beginning funding base for the school, not the campus, as had 
been the case for the other schools. Therefore, it appears that the “quasi RC” 
appropriately describes the school’s funding status. 
Hospital Consolidation 
 Another economic sub theme that was identified as an external force in the 
school’s reorganization was the consolidation of three of the academic center’s hospitals 
prior to the SAHS’s reorganization. The consolidation resulted in the SAHS having to 
take on the salaries of tenured faculty members that had, up to that point, been covered by 
the hospitals. The data indicate that the consolidation played a small role, being 
overshadowed by more significant factors, yet it did contribute to the economic pressures. 
 When commenting on the role that hospital consolidation played in the 
reorganization, one faculty member made a comment typical of colleague reactions: “The 
consolidation process ditched our people and didn’t provide the $220K base needed to 
cover their salaries.” The Dean’s reorganization plan also noted the challenges placed on 
the school from the consolidation, “…it soon became clear that the hospital consolidation 
created a real challenge to going ahead with creating an independent school.” Others 
indicated that “while the consolidation was a reason for the shortfall...it was a disguise of 
a real shortfall that existed all along.”  
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Lack of Administrative Support 
The lack of help from the SOM and central administration was seen to have 
played a minor, although significant, role in the reorganization. Those interviewed for 
this study expressed concern regarding lack of support for the financial allocations the 
school had deemed appropriate.  
 
“Campus didn’t help” 
 
“We were viewed as a SOM stepchild and the campus saw us as a SOM problem.” 
 
“Chancellor was convinced that the SOM would bail them out.” 
 
“It is not the role of the SOM to be the savior when others will not accept their legitimate 
responsibilities.” 
 
 The SOM dean was very clear in stating his position that the SAHS was not part 
of the SOM core mission, nor should the campus expect the SOM to “bail them out.” 
Interestingly, some of the SAHS faculty and others interviewed for the study did have the 
perception that the SAHS was a “SOM stepchild” and that the SOM “could have worked 
out a solution,” as stated by a SAHS faculty member.  
 With the exception of central administration’s role in helping the physical therapy 
program, which will be discussed below, the data indicate a very minor role on the part of 
central administration in the reorganization process. Although a few faculty members felt 
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that “central administration had led the Dean down the road” and had influenced the plan 
for the break-up of the school, others felt that central administration “needed a test case 
for the new campus policy.” The Dean of the Faculties was identified in the data as 
having helped shape the process by his actions. Study participants said: “He said he 
would not hear a vote of no confidence…” and “He was more concerned with figuring 
out a way that no one would lose face.” One central administrator gave the impression 
that he was discouraging faculty input by stating, “We will expect communication from 
the faculty to flow through the SAHS Dean and we encourage you to direct your 
collective responses to the report to us through him.” Other faculty members simply 
thought that the “campus level was confused.”  
The Whitman University Faculty Council was also identified as playing a small 
role in the school’s reorganization. Some saw it as a pawn of higher administration, such 
as the study participant who said, “Faculty Council was used when it was convenient for 
them.”  
However, a review of the Faculty Council actions indicates that the Executive 
Committee did identify problems with the Dean’s original plan, as indicated in this 
excerpt from the Faculty Council minutes when the Dean’s plan was originally discussed. 
“The Executive Committee had some problems with the plan. The fact that funds 
for tenured faculty members necessarily follow the faculty members does not fit 
the original spirit and intent of the policy. Meeting the educational needs for 
health care professionals to service the citizens of the state should be given 
priority over the need to pay faculty members – otherwise our students get 
shortchanged. Also, it seems some programs will be discontinued because of the 
need to recruit doctorally trained faculty members, even though the terminal 
degree for the discipline is not the doctorate, and that this supposed “need” 
couldn’t be met led to the closure of the programs – a vicious circle. Also, the 
assumption that some of the faculty members will be retiring even though 
retirement is not mandated, was linked to problems with the budgetary figures 
(although the Dean did address this problem in his written response to the 
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Executive Committee’s report). Last, there was the general feeling by the 
members of the Executive Committee that the spirit and intent of the policy was 
not followed with regard to involving the students and faculty members.” 
 
 Moreover, the Faculty Council was thorough and deliberate in keeping the 
reorganization process on the schedule dictated by applicable campus policies and 
procedures as identified from this faculty comment, “…the campus policy drove the 
process.” As delineated in Appendix B, the campus policy (PTMR) provided the 
framework for the SAHS reorganization process. 
Physical Therapy Program Accreditation 
While the PT accrediting body was a major external force and the probationary 
accreditation status of the PT program and the post BS mandate did contribute to the 
overall process, it affected the internal dynamics of the reorganization process more 
directly, namely the impetus for the loan from central administration to the program, so it 
will be discussed in the section below on internal forces. Briefly, an accreditation visit 
found the program unacceptable in certain areas primarily related to classroom and 
laboratory facilities. Addressing these issues would be at a considerable cost to the 
school. However, the SAHS had to make the investment if the PT program was to 
successfully make the transition from the BS program to the Doctorate of Physical 
Therapy. 
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Internal Forces: “Inadequate Funding, That’s the Bottom Line.” 
 Economic themes dominated the Internal Forces structural category. The school’s 
culture, faculty involvement and the drive for school independence were contributing 
internal forces to the school’s reorganization, but it was the lack of funding or poor 
financial planning that produced the most significant theme. Loss of tuition, extramural 
funding and state dollars were all contributing factors to the school’s economic problems 
and, to a lesser degree, the hospitals’ consolidation, mentioned earlier.  
 
“Although several things had an adjunct effect, economic factors was the culprit.” 
 
When asked during his five year review how the budget had changed when he 
took over as dean, the dean replied, “...Three years ago my budget was $4.5 million and it 
is now $3.9 million, with the same expenses.” Moreover, the Dean stated that, “In the 
past two years the SAHS has cut nearly $600,000 from its operating budget.” The 
External Advisory Committee in its report concluded that, “The current financial 
resources available to the SAHS are not adequate to support the programs. The situation 
is a result of both historical factors and decisions.” The data indicate that there was a 
general consensus among the faculty and the administration that the school was not 
properly funded from the beginning. One faculty member summarized the feelings of 
most: 
 
“Decreasing enrollments certainly affected tuition revenue but the overall shortfall 
appeared to me to be too great.” 
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 The advent of school status in 1991 created new fiscal issues. As the SAHS 
became independent of the SOM, all program budgets including those that had been in 
SOM departments moved to the SAHS  This meant that the SOM would no longer be 
buffering enrollment shifts, faculty salaries originally supported by the hospitals, or 
changes in state appropriations. Initially, tuition dollars were funding the school 
adequately according to the economic modeling data but with the move to school status, 
other sources of revenue had to be developed. Shortly thereafter came the hospital 
merger. The hospitals, as a result of the merger, transitioned from an educational to a 
business model of operations, resulting in the withdrawal of salary dollars for tenured 
SAHS faculty that were hospital-based. With rising expenditures, and no new revenue 
streams, the shortfall began to develop. Commenting on the impact of these factors, 
faculty members said, 
 
“However, in the space of two years we went from making $17K per year to losing $11K 
per year.” 
 
“State not supporting at the levels as in the past.” 
 
“Base support not there. Hospital merger killed us.” 
 
 Lack of support for tenured faculty members who had been transferred to the 
SAHS as a result of the hospital merger was one financial stressor. This problem is 
detailed in this quote from the Dean, “There is $2,246,631 in SAHS tenured faculty cost 
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with net state appropriations of $2,130,754. As such there are no extra state 
appropriations remaining to allocate…”  
Program expansion also contributed to financial problems. A retrospective faculty 
comment tells the story, “At the time of the moves people didn’t fully appreciate the 
potential pitfalls of expanding the number of programs in the school so rapidly.” One of 
the reasons this may have been allowed to happen was described by a SAHS faculty 
member, “During the early years of the incubator school, high enrollments were the trend 
with the PT program going from 35 students to 70, generating enough revenue to cover 
the programs that couldn’t pay for themselves.” There was a spirit of optimism, 
“Therefore, in the beginning on paper everything looked okay, tuition dollars were 
coming in and the previous Dean and a few other faculty members were also bringing in 
research dollars.” Although not large in terms of dollar amount, these research dollars 
were needed to keep the SAHS in the black. 
 When PT enrollments started to fall and the research money left, the school 
found itself in quite a predicament. The dominant subtheme derived from the data 
analysis on program expansion was the influence of the Physical Therapy (PT) program.  
An examination of the various aspects of this subtheme reveals that the economic needs 
of the PT program were perceived as playing a significant part in the economic crisis that 
the school was experiencing. Specifically, the PT program went from being in the 
position of supporting shortfalls in the revenue of other programs to needing subsidy 
from them. 
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“During the early years of the incubator school, 1993 high enrollment was the trend with 
the PT program going from 35 students to 70 generating enough revenue to cover the 
programs that couldn’t do it on their own.” 
“All of this was critical for the school’s survival, if PT died the SAHS budget wouldn’t 
make it, the school would go under.” 
 
“PT economically was very important to the school.” 
 
“PT’s excess revenue underwrote the other programs, not an adequate state base; rob 
Peter to pay Paul.” 
 
 When asked what role the PT program played in the school’s reorganization a 
faculty member commented, “An important role. The Dean apparently decided to save 
the PT program at all costs and used all the cash reserves and took money from other 
programs to keep them.” Other faculty members agreed, with one stating that, “All of this 
was critical for the school’s survival; if PT died the SAHS budget would not make 
it…the school would go under.” Although PT had been relied upon for credit hour 
generation to support the other units, it now needed funds and thus was a short-term 
liability. If SAHS wished to continue to rely upon PT revenue, it had to invest in it. And 
the investment was significant. 
 Specifically, the renovation of the PT classroom and laboratory space was seen as 
the most important aspect of the internal economic pressures related to PT. The 
renovation was needed to address specific problems the program was having with its 
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accreditation, which had to be rectified before the faculty could continue to accept 
students into the existing program and move to the planned Doctor of Physical Therapy 
degree, being promoted by its professional association. 
“The first priority was to get more space…so we needed $750K of money just to get to 
this point.” 
 
“Moving directly to a DPT was the best option.” 
 
“The PT classroom renovation that was required for their reaccredidation used 
resources from all of the programs and drained the school’s cash reserves.” 
 
“Rebuilding PT was the catalyst of the reorganization.” 
 
 The first priority for keeping the PT program’s accreditation was to address their 
dire need for more classroom space. The Dean identified appropriate space with the help 
of the SOM but it would need significant renovation. The Dean estimated that it would 
take $750K to renovate the space. In order to raise the money the Dean used all of the 
school’s reserves and took funds from the other programs. This created very low overall 
faculty morale as exemplified in comments by this disgruntled faculty member, “PT got 
other program’s dollars…individual programs never got their revenue…therefore there 
was no incentive for faculty to generate dollars, it would just be taken away.” The 
economic modeling data indicated that after the Dean used the school’s available 
resources for PT, a loan of some type would be needed to defer the developing school 
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deficit. The Dean indicated at that juncture, “…we were losing $300-500K per year in 
tuition revenue.” as the PT enrollment continued to decrease from a high of 
approximately 75 students to less than half that by 2001. 
 It was also decided during this period that moving the program directly to a 
Doctor of Physical Therapy (DPT) would be the best option for the PT program in view 
of the current mandate by its accrediting body that faculty move to post baccalaureate 
education. The rationale was that by offering the DPT program, student interest in the 
program would increase and more tuition dollars would be generated as mentioned in the 
report from the External Advisory Committee, “Graduate fees were more promising than 
undergraduate for revenue generating.” However, going to the DPT would create 
additional economic problems including the need to hire doctorally prepared faculty. 
Despite these, SAHS pursued this direction.  One faculty member shared that they, “went 
to DPT…even though the actual dollars were not there!” 
 When it became clear that a loan for the PT program would be needed and that a 
transition to the DPT was critical for PT’s success, central administration, at the request 
of the Dean, entered the picture. One faculty member described the scenario in this 
fashion, “the dean of the faculties put all his weight behind helping the Dean (SAHS) get 
what he wanted.” Additionally, the chancellor lent his support as well, as described in a 
letter from the Chancellor to the SAHS faculty concerning the reorganization process, 
“We are developing a plan for a loan to the SAHS as the PT program is changed to a 
graduate level offering.” The following summarizes the overall perception of the faculty 
concerning PT's role in the reorganization process, “The Dean (SAHS) convinced central 
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administration that the DPT was required for the PT program to keep its accreditation and 
without the PT program the SAHS could not survive.” 
The culture of the SAHS at the time of the reorganization process was identified 
as one of the internal subthemes, along with faculty involvement and the drive for school 
independence.  
Culture and SAHS independence from the SOM are mentioned generally only in 
passing as part of the reorganization process. Faculty roles changed as the process 
developed. Faculty developed strong ties to their individual programs and these loyalties 
sometimes led them to see programs in competition with each other for resources rather 
than to focus on the common good.  The faculty never felt their efforts were being heard 
and programmatic loyalties began to surface. Eventually, the programs began circling the 
wagons. The faculty members felt they were “a federation rather that a school entity” and 
that it was down to “every program for itself.” 
 The culture of the SAHS was best described by one of the interviewees as “not a 
school but a collection of programs.” Other faculty, embittered by the process simply 
stated that the school was a “10-year experiment that failed.” 
Involvement  
Initially, faculty were shocked with the news of financial crisis and rallied 
together for support as described in the following quotes. 
 
“We were really surprised to hear the news, especially since he had spent the previous 
few months touting school independence.” 
 
 66 
“Faculty showed a lot of leadership rallying for a solution. 
“Faculty did try to pull together and develop their own plan.” 
“Did the faculty plan get a fair hearing?” 
“The alternative plan never had a chance.”  
 
 In the program directors’ response to the dean’s reorganization plan it was 
mentioned that, “No discussions occurred directly with affected program faculty, 
students, alumni or leaders of professional organizations before the distribution of the 
Dean’s proposal.” Their response also states the following, “It is misleading to describe 
this work as one that allowed for faculty input. The plan was devised by the dean without 
benefit of the faculty’s collective wisdom.” This theme of faculty involvement is 
intertwined with the findings detailed below in the third major structural category, 
leadership. 
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Leadership: “Not a Good Communicator.” 
 
 The quote above from a faculty member was characteristic of the overall themes 
described in the data analysis related to leadership. Themes related to leadership included 
several aspects of the Dean’s leadership style. These are central to the findings in this 
case. While the internal and external forces presented a highly challenging situation for 
the school, problems related to communication style increased the tension and disturbed 
the trust level of the faculty, affecting the way in which the SAHS reorganization played 
out. 
 
“The Dean has poor communication skills…never collaborated” 
 
“Here’s what I think you need to know”… was his most common 
expression 
 
“Top Down Leadership Style” 
 
 The quotes above are consistent with the findings of the Dean’s five-year 
administrative review conducted immediately following the school’s reorganization. The 
review committee’s findings identified a significant communication disconnect between 
the Dean and the faculty as illustrated from the following excerpt from the Dean’s five-
year review report. 
 
“The greatest criticism expressed of the Dean regards his communication with the 
faculty.” 
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 The data indicate that the primary themes and subthemes related to his leadership 
style were indicative of his communication problems with the faculty as well as their 
apparent mistrust of the process and his end result of reorganization for the school. 
Faculty were often quoted as expressing observations such as 
 
“Once he got an idea in his head he went for it.” 
“Getting faculty input was an afterthought.” 
“He did it on his own but went to great lengths to try and convince everyone it was a 
collaborative effort with the stakeholders.” 
“Some also claimed that he did not follow university policies” 
“…It was the dominant role. The Dean’s lack of communication skills created all kinds of 
problems and made everyone suspicious of the whole process. It created an atmosphere 
of distrust.” 
“However, many felt the books were cooked.” 
“His leadership strategy was to be an advocate for his plan and present it as the only 
option.” 
“His attitude was that I have the information and I will give you what you need to know.” 
“A man I found hard to trust.” 
  
 Another contributing factor to the mistrust of the Dean was an overriding feeling 
by the faculty that he had his own agenda and was using the financial problems of the 
school to further his dream of an independent school comprised of programs offering 
only graduate education. 
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“Opportunity to do his own thing…Graduate education.” 
“The Dean used the school’s predicament to develop a plan that would allow him to 
realize his dream.” 
“The school’s financial issues were not as significant as he made them. If the financial 
aspects could have been solved he would still have wanted to go for his dream.”  
“By the time faculty found out what was happening it really didn’t matter.” 
“Faculty weren’t engaged until the end and were pissed!” 
 
 Other aspects of the mistrust of the Dean center on the perception that he 
collaborated in some way with higher administration in developing his plan, as illustrated 
by these faculty comments. 
 
“The Dean dissolved it 100% with the support of the Chancellor and Dean of the 
Faculties.” 
“The preliminary proposal was distributed to the Chancellor and Dean of Faculties and 
the SOM Dean before it was shared with the SAHS faculty. 
 
“The Dean kept all of his information close to his chest.” 
“They misinformed the entire faculty.” 
 
Moreover, the campus Faculty Council’s Executive Committee echoed the 
mistrust of dean by the school’s faculty as identified in these excerpts from Faculty 
Council Meeting minutes. 
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‘The Executive Committee of the Faculty Council believes the spirit and intent of the 
[PTMR] policy was not followed.” 
“The Executive Committee questions the budget figures and projections provided in the 
SAHS Dean’s plan.” 
“The [Whitman]University Faculty Council Executive Committee initially rejected the 
Dean’s Academic and Budgetary Plan, then accepted it after revisions and 
recommendations were made,” 
 
 Positive comments concerning the Dean’s role in the reorganization process were 
few. However, he was often complimented on his public presentation. One faculty 
member expressed the following thoughts: “The Dean presents himself well in public. He 
is prepared and eloquent although vague when he speaks.” He was also complimented on 
his ability to secure funds for the PT classroom and laboratory renovation and the 
successful approval and accreditation of the Doctor of Physical Therapy program. One 
interviewee specifically said that without the Dean’s strong management of the situation, 
the outcome would have been much worse. He was also characterized by many 
interviewees during his five year review as being, “a man of integrity and honesty.” A 
university administrator was quoted as saying, 
 
 “In terms of problem solving ability and management of several difficult issues during 
his tenure as Dean, I give him high marks.” 
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Summary 
The results of the data analysis clearly articulated the relative significance of each 
structural category. Leadership was identified as being the most significant structural 
category contributing to the school’s reorganization. Economic factors from both internal 
and external forces contributed to the school’s reorganization but were overshadowed by 
the communication disconnect that permeated the leadership category. 
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Chapter 5:  Discussion and Summary 
As recounted in the previous chapter, the reorganization of the SAHS at Whitman 
University occurred in the context of several forces. Internal and external forces along 
with leadership played a role in the school’s reorganization. This chapter will highlight 
for discussion the major aspects of the most significant of these.  
A Hologram for Decision Making: “There Was a Premeditated Plan for the School’s 
Reorganization” 
 Organizational change during the school’s reorganization process can be 
summarized in two related phenomena, the first being the communication disconnect 
between the Dean and the faculty and the second, the perception that the Dean’s 
academic and budgetary plan was not a result of a rational decision making process and 
lacked validity.  
Top Down Management 
 The Dean’s interactions with the school’s Ad Hoc Economic Modeling 
Committee were characteristic and predictive of his approach to interacting with other 
committees and related groups throughout the SAHS reorganization process. The Dean’s 
interaction with this committee will be used in this discussion as an example of his 
interactions not only with this committee, but with other decision making bodies as well.  
When first becoming aware of the dire financial condition of the SAHS, the Dean 
initiated deliberations by way of establishing an Ad Hoc Economic Modeling Committee 
consisting of selected faculty members and chaired by the Associate Dean of the School. 
This action is customary to most similar types of endeavors in the academy whereby 
faculty committees are formed by administrators to address issues and are then charged to 
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hammer out the details and subsequent guidelines of how to deal with the issues and  
resolve the problem. Once that is accomplished recommendations are then made to the 
responsible administrator, in this case, the Dean. Unfortunately, faculty confidence in the 
process and lack of trust in the Dean’s intentions during the economic modeling process 
largely derailed the process as described in the faculty comments below. 
 
“They developed hundreds of models, none of them correct” 
 
“False scenarios were presented to permit the Dean and Dean of Faculties to do 
their own thing” 
 
 
 
Problems surfaced in faculty perceptions of the Dean’s organizational approach 
from the start of the SAHS Ad Hoc Economic Modeling Committee. Although he didn’t 
chair the committee himself, the Dean’s appointment of the Associate Dean was viewed 
by many as an attempt on his part to influence the committee’s deliberations. 
 
“The Associate Dean was appointed by the Dean to be the Chair of the SAHS economic 
modeling committee, and at the first meeting, told us that faculty have their own minds 
but the faculty knew that she would simply report back to the SAHS Dean what we 
discussed and would be pushing his agenda.” (Quote from a committee member) 
 
 
 As indicated above, the perception among faculty was that the Dean was setting up a 
hierarchy of functions where there were commanders and commands. The Dean had used 
a similar approach in the past by inserting administrative liaisons into faculty committees. 
 The Dean’s approach fits very well into Schwartz’s and Ogilvy’s paradigm under 
the hierarchic to heterarchic construct whereby his inserting the associate dean into the 
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mix allowed him to interject a net of constraints and influences (Clark, 1985). The 
strengths of this approach would be to establish a peer committee that would review the 
data and then come up with recommendations that would appear fair and equitable to the 
faculty based upon his indirectly applied guiding principles. However, the weaknesses of 
the Dean’s approach are even more apparent in that he interjected hierarchy through 
appointing his administrative colleague to chair the committee. Such hierarchical 
imperatives are ineffective in systems where there are participatory decision making and 
decentralization, as pointed out by Clark (1985). Although the SAHS is organized in 
many ways like a bureaucracy, it is far from the classic sense that would be needed for 
the hierarchical approach to be successful. More consistently, the SAHS organization 
resembles a professional bureaucracy as described by Mintzberg (2000). In this case it is 
understood that professionals have considerable control over their work, thus, the 
professional works independently of his colleagues. Human action, in this case faculty 
work, cannot be oriented successfully in a hierarchical sense. The faculty committee 
rejected the Dean’s attempt at this approach of inserting the Associate Dean immediately. 
During the course of these discussions, Cohen and March’s “garbage can” model of 
decision making became more and more appealing (Cohen and March, 2000). Eventually, 
the faculty committee rejected the Dean’s indirect guiding principles and began their own 
decision making process whereby they used the available data to formulate their own 
decisions. Unfortunately, the data were made available to them in a piecemeal fashion 
that were changing as new economic models were being produced. 
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 For each step in the reorganization process the Dean routinely presented choices 
for addressing the problems and issues facing the various arenas of interest. In some 
cases he alienated some of the faculty members, as described by one: 
 
“Here’s what I think you need to know… was his most common expression.” 
 
The decision makers (committee members), would then discuss alternative approaches to 
most of the Dean’s suggestions for addressing the school’s problems. The committee 
clearly did not agree with the mechanical approach of the Dean and gravitated toward a 
type of interconnectedness described by Clark when commenting on the holographic 
metaphor where holography is employed as a counter-metaphor to a machine-like 
approach (Clark, 1985). Morgan’s (1986) description of holographic design had in 
common many of the characteristics of the committee work during the reorganization 
process. The committee was very much a “self-organizing, emergent phenomenon” as 
Morgan describes the holographic style of organization. It seemed that every committee 
member had strong feelings concerning how the school got into financial difficulty and 
how they would get out. It was at this juncture that the strengths of the holographic 
design began to be realized. Although members had their own ideals, the faculty culture 
made it possible for all members to be willing to listen and learn about the others’ ideas 
and concerns.  
Morgan observes that culture is a major source of power influencing effective 
management. After much multiple loop (and redundant) discussion it became apparent 
that the separate parts eventually became integrated into a whole. This permeated the 
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value system of the individual committee members, thus reproducing itself and 
essentially changing the tone of the process from one of dictatorial management to an 
opportunity for the faculty to have a voice. The major weakness of this approach is the 
danger of self-reference. It is quite likely that in their exercise of “brains looking at 
brains” they may have overlooked an important source of conflict or information that 
could have contributed to the final outcome. Another important related consideration is 
the potential that the committee may have become isolated from the rest of the faculty. 
Bensimon and Neuman (1993) describe ways in which a team (in this case the 
committee) may lose touch with the rest of the faculty by “turning in on themselves”. 
 The evolution of the committee’s organizational considerations resulted in a 
coupling of classical hierarchical organizational characteristics to a more neo-orthodox 
holographic approach. Additional organizational considerations center on Clark’s 
discussion of the importance of negotiating the formal and informal structures of an 
organization. The committee wrestled with this paradox throughout its deliberations.  
 Unfortunately, the committee’s endpoint, as a result of this “holographic 
experience”, was perceived by the faculty as never being fully realized. As described by 
the outward expressions of the faculty’s dismay presented in the quotes below: 
 
 
“The Dean wanted faculty engagement but didn’t allow for an open and honest 
dialogue” 
 
“Biggest problem was the Dean’s belief that the faculty were involved in the process… 
 
However, faculty came away thinking “the Dean did this to us” he didn’t listen. 
 
 
 
 77 
“No One Would Believe Me!” 
  
 The quote above well describes the Dean’s frustration with the overall acceptance 
of his reorganization plan for the school.  
 
“Bird nest scenario: 14 children but not enough food for all 14 . . . Programs did 
not come with adequate revenue when jettisoned from other departments to form 
the SAHS . . . SAHS couldn’t afford them either” 
 
 
Yet the Dean’s inability to help faculty realize the set of circumstances that faced the 
school, along with his communication style, led faculty to think that he was not being 
open or honest, and that in many ways, his plan was not the result of rational thinking, 
nor was it informed by faculty thinking. 
The Dean’s decision making process in addressing the reality described in the 
university administrator’s quote above is best understood using normative decision theory 
as described by  Chaffee (1991), who describes rational decision making in university 
budgeting to be a “normative ideal, but not susceptible to practice.” When practiced, 
rational decision making should consist of four criteria: goals, alternatives, consequences 
and the selection of those consequences (choice) that rank the highest among the decision 
maker’s values. The criteria and their associated elements to test the rational model for 
the Dean’s reorganization plan for the SAHS will be discussed below. 
 
 
 
 
 78 
Criterion 1: Goals 
The first criterion requires that the Dean have a consistent set of priorities 
regarding what he was interested in funding for the future. A review of his plan indicates 
the following principal elements: 
1. academic importance 
2. potential tuition revenue 
3. extramural funding potential 
4. preservation of tenured faculty 
5. graduate education 
 
The Dean used these as justification for retaining, eliminating or moving academic 
programs out of the SAHS. The Dean was consistent in his use of the criteria and clearly 
used these in his decision making process when developing his plan. In the listing of his 
11 recommendations for the reorganization of the school, the Dean utilized each of the 
elements listed above with the end result being a cluster of graduate health science 
degrees. Thus, it appears the Dean has satisfied the first criterion for the rational model 
by being consistent in his use of his identified funding priorities. Although the Dean 
inadvertently articulated these, they were never given to the faculty. 
Criterion 2: Alternatives 
 In a rational process the Dean should have simultaneously considered a wide 
array of funding alternatives for the SAHS. Several aspects of the Dean’s actions are 
consistent with this criterion. He utilized economic modeling resources to examine 
several funding alternatives for the school before deciding on a course of action. 
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Secondly, he was diligent in following the University’s protocol for financial exigency, 
which aided him in obtaining numerous pieces of information from, arguably, most 
communities of interest for the school. Various faculty committees, the Whitman 
University Faculty Council and an external advisory committee among others, were all 
instrumental in providing him with a wide array of funding alternatives simultaneously.  
In communications with the faculty and other stakeholders he stated his intentions and 
acknowledged the various sources he used in drafting his plan. The chronology of events 
surrounding the reorganization indicates that the Dean indeed had a wide array of 
alternatives before him to consider before making his budget decisions. The (PTMR) 
policy outlined a distinctive working framework and chronology of events guaranteeing 
him simultaneous information about various funding alternatives. He specifically states in 
his plan that the basis for the decisions he made incorporated the recommendations of 
committees formed to study the problem and that he made every effort to be consistent 
with university personnel and budgetary policies. 
Whether or not he thoughtfully considered each alternative is a matter of 
judgment. However, he certainly had a wide range of alternatives to consider. The 
evidence for a wide array of simultaneous alternatives is unequivocal and satisfies the 
second criterion for the rational model. 
Criterion 3: Consequences 
 The third criterion deals with the quality of information available to the Dean. Did 
the Dean have sufficient information to understand the causes and effects of his 
decisions? Although many members of the faculty and others felt that the Dean was 
acting unilaterally, it appears that he did make a conscientious effort to follow the 
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university’s policies and procedures document and other relevant information, as 
discussed above. This inherently provided him with numerous scenarios outlining the 
causes and effects of various objective courses of action. Moreover, early in the scheme 
of things, the Dean assembled an Ad Hoc Committee to examine the economic models 
that he was considering and solicited their input into what course of action was needed 
for the school. However, several of the committee members expressed concerns that he 
had been meeting with the economic modeling office for sometime prior to the faculty 
becoming aware of the school’s financial problems and had already developed his plan of 
action. Whether that was the case or not is just speculation. A systematic review of his 
plan clearly indicates that the Dean did have sufficient information to be able to 
understand the causes and effects of his decisions before the release of his plan. 
Moreover, he solicited numerous pieces of information directly related to causes and 
effects for each program by asking them to submit reports to him. The report was to 
describe the academic aspects of their program, but as well to justify their existence. 
While met with resistance by some program directors, the reports along with other 
supporting evidence did provide important information to the Dean concerning the causes 
and effects of eliminating or jettisoning their programs from the school. These reports 
included information about enrollment trends and specific assessment information, such 
as the students’ pass rates on their national exams, along with employment and retention 
data. All of these actions demonstrated a consistent theme of relating causes and effects 
for each program the Dean was to consider. Although the evidence is not strong that he 
considered all of the available alternatives, he had many alternatives to choose from when 
developing his course of action. 
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Criterion 4: Choice 
 The rationality of the Dean’s choices can be observed through their links to his 
previously identified list of funding priorities, which include academic performance, 
student interest or potential tuition revenue, extramural funding potential, and 
preservation of tenured faculty and graduate education. Neither academic performance 
nor funding potential is easily susceptible for measurement. However, if the Dean made 
his decisions according to any one or more of the five goals, he satisfies the behavioral 
model of rationality. The Dean was able to measure student interest or potential for 
tuition revenue by the student’s registration in courses and whether or not the program’s 
student capacity was filled in recent years. The goal for graduate programs could be 
easily measured since the program either offered graduate education or it didn’t. The 
Dean’s priority for excellence can’t be measured as directly, but a reasonable 
approximation was possible since the Dean had historical information related to student 
and faculty performance by a number of indicators including students’ performance on 
their national board exams, enrollment data, faculty publications and service on 
university committees, to name the major ones. Most of this information was readily 
accessible to the Dean via the assessment report generated by the school as part of the 
university’s assessment program. The number of tenured faculty in each program was a 
critical consideration since the university’s funding for each program was directly related 
to state appropriations. Thus, the university document on financial exigency basically 
mandated that the Dean use that element as a major part of his decision making. 
Therefore, even given that not all of the elements were easily measurable; it does appear 
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that the Dean should have been able to select his preferences based upon his ability to 
select the maximizing alternatives.  
Summary 
 The evidence in support of a rational decision process is substantial but not 
unequivocal. The evidence is strong for a consistent set of goals, for simultaneous 
selection from a wide array of alternatives, and for at least a satisfying choice among the 
alternatives. However, the argument for rationality would be more convincing if there 
were a clearer connection between the data at hand and the ways in which performance 
information were matched to the decisions, especially in the case of academic 
performance and extramural funding potential, which were hard to measure. 
 Although some of the school’s faculty and other observers of the Dean’s decision 
making process would argue that his decision making process was anything but rational, 
the process shows substantial signs of procedural and substantive rationality. The Dean’s 
plan for the school’s reorganization was comprehensive and exhaustive in scope and 
delineated the accumulated data that he used in his decision making process. In the final 
analysis however, it is important to take note that whatever the Dean’s decision making 
model, different treatment of programs by the Dean within the school signaled his 
organizational priorities and his perception of the program’s worth or power. His failure 
to articulate the connection between the data he gathered and the resulting decisions led 
to the perception that his approach was not entirely rational.  
In addition to the Dean’s lack of communication, the faculty’s perception of the 
Dean’s plan was also influenced by their lack of information, denial of their reality and 
self interests. Moreover, as the reorganization process unfolded, the faculty became less 
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interested in dialoguing with the Dean, which contributed to the overall breakdown in 
communication. 
 “Experiment That Failed” 
 Morgan’s (1996) discussion of organizations in reference to what he calls “logics 
of change” applies well to the organizational curiosities associated with the School of 
Allied Health Sciences (SAHS) and its subsequent failure to survive as characterized by 
the faculty quote above. Specifically, two of the four processes mentioned by Morgan, 
autopoiesis and chaos complexity theory are well suited for this purpose. 
 Autopoiesis: The theory of autopoiesis accepts that organizations can be 
recognized as having environments but insists that the relations with any environment are 
internally determined (Morgan). For the SAHS there were indeed interactions with many 
different types of systems within the academy, but oftentimes those relationships were 
determined by the larger health care environment. For example, the SAHS found itself a 
school within a school. 
 Chaos and Complexity: When discussing the logic of chaos and complexity 
theory, Morgan emphasized that chaos theorists paid particular attention to the way 
system behaviors tend to fall under the influence of different “attractors.” For example, 
an organization may find itself caught between different “attractors” that go before 
different situations and the organization finds itself pulled toward one thus diminishing 
the significance of the other. This concept describes very well the circumstances of the 
SAHS, where the school found itself being pulled between its academic mission, being 
part of the medical school and its economic reality. 
Organizational Problem Analysis 
 Therefore, the overall organizational problem facing the SAHS can be 
summarized as an identity problem whereby the SAHS was vacillating between trying to 
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fulfill its academic mission, being a school within a school, and dwindling economic 
resources. 
 Morgan identified this type of organizational problem in his discussion of 
autopoiesis as an organizational metaphor. He tells us that many of the problems 
organizations encounter in dealing with their environments are intimately connected with 
the kind of identity they try to maintain. The SAHS, while expending great resources 
trying to maintain its academic identity separate from the School of Medicine, found 
itself self-referenced back to the academic health care environment with the illusion that 
it had somehow extended its academic identity. The SAHS had some autonomy from the 
School of Medicine, but not enough to function as a free standing school. 
“Change Is Messy”  
 As described by a faculty member in the quote above, the SAHS was 
experiencing turmoil in all three of its traditional missions of teaching, research and 
service. Clashes of values and norms of the cultures within the university and the SAHS 
hindered effective adaptation to the stresses affecting the SAHS. Administrators, faculty 
and staff all had strongly conflicting perspectives. In general, the internal organizational 
structure of the SAHS resembled a professional bureaucracy, as described by Mintzberg 
(2000) where the professionals have considerable control over their work. This aspect of 
SAHS governance, along with the observation that most departments within SAHS were 
part of a “loosely coupled” educational system (Weick, 2000) made any reorganization of 
any kind difficult for the SAHS.  
 Schools of allied health sciences have played an important role in the 
improvement of health care delivery. The schools of allied health sciences that 
successfully weather the current storm in the health care environment will be stronger 
institutions. However, in order to do so they must come to terms with their entrenched 
cultures and create new forms of organization that are more flexible, more adaptive and 
more agile. They must overcome their current state of schizophrenia and synthesize a 
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new identity, a “hybrid” of what they are today, part business, and part academic (Vavala, 
1996). 
 The overall lessons to be learned from this case study are threefold. Both faculty 
and administrators, when faced with a problem of this magnitude, must be willing to face 
the reality of the situation, be dedicated to the truth and have the discipline to work 
together. The process of confronting and solving problems is a difficult one. 
Uncomfortable feelings emerge such as frustration, grief, sadness, anger, fear and 
anxiety. This phenomenon helps to explain why many of the school’s problems were 
ignored by both the faculty and the administration until they could be ignored no longer.  
M. Scott Peck (2003) tells us that “not only individuals but also organizations are 
notorious for protecting themselves against challenge” (p. 52). He goes on to tell us that 
in order for organizations to grow in wisdom and be viable and effective they must be 
willing to accept and welcome challenges. 
Recommendations for Future Study 
 This case study in organizational change identified the inherent necessity of direct 
and legitimate communication between the SAHS Dean and the faculty. The 
communication disconnect that was identified as the dominant driving force during the 
reorganization process directly points to the need for further research into communication 
techniques and methodologies whereby faculty and administrators can dialogue 
effectively for their common good.  Communication that facilitates a hearty and robust 
dialogue between the Dean and the faculty was glaringly absent in the SAHS, as pointed 
out by the case study data, creating a milieu of distrust and anxiety.   
Limitations of this study include the single-case design. A multiple case design 
would strengthen future studies by allowing for the inclusion of multiple institutional 
characteristics that might broaden the scope of this single case study. Additionally, future 
case studies would benefit from the larger database that a multiple case design would 
provide. 
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Appendix A 
Interview Questions 
Internal Forces 
• What internal forces contributed to and led to the school’s reorganization? 
• What was your perception of the faculty’s reaction, role and response to the 
school’s predicament? 
• In your opinion what led to the economic collapse of the school? 
• What if any role did the drive toward school independence play? 
• Did the Dean’s desire for graduate education affect the process? 
• What role if any did fluctuation in the school’s enrollment play? 
• Did the lack or loss of external funding after the previous Dean left play a role? 
• What if any role did the economics of the Physical Therapy program play in the 
schools solvency? 
• Was money the major factor? Why or why not? 
• Did the faculty’s alternative plan get a fair hearing? 
• Was the faculty cohesive or not cohesive during the process? Was it every 
program for themselves?  
• Could a faculty consensus be built? 
• Did tenure factor into the mix? 
• What role did the previous Dean play in the process? 
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External Forces 
• What external forces contributed to and led to the school’s reorganization? 
• Was the hospital consolidation a major factor? 
• What role did national trends e.g., the Balanced Budget Act play? 
• What was your impression of the School of Medicine’s role in the process? e.g., 
should they have bailed SAHS out? 
• Did higher administration play a role and if so, what was it? 
•  What role did RCM (Responsibility Center Management) play in the school’s 
reorganization? 
• Were university politics a factor? 
• Were accreditation issues a factor in the school’s reorganization, e.g., mandated 
post baccalaureate education for Physical Therapy? 
• What role did the Faculty Council play? 
• Did the campus policy (PTMR) play a role in the process? 
• What is your impression of the role the economic modeling process played? 
• What was your impression of the role of the external advisory committee? 
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Leadership 
• What role did leadership play in the reorganization of the school? 
• What role did the Dean’s leadership characteristics play in shaping the 
reorganization process? 
• What were your thoughts concerning the development of the Dean’s plan? 
• Did the Dean’s leadership team have a role in the process e.g., Associate Dean? 
• How would you describe the Dean’s leadership style based upon your personal 
interactions with him? 
• Did the Dean lobby enough for help for the school both within and outside the 
university? 
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Appendix B 
September 4, 2001 
Chronology and Timeline for Consideration of Program Transfer, Merger, 
Reorganization, Reduction and Elimination in the School of Allied Health 
Sciences 
(Developed by the Deans of the SAHS, SOM, Dean of the Faculties and the 
Chancellor in consultation with Faculty Council Executive Committee, 
(8/30/01) 
 
 
1999-2000  
(and earlier) 
Considerable concern about and discussion of the 
economic and academic condition of the School 
due to enrollment shifts, accreditation, hospital 
consolidation and other complex factors.  School 
of Allied Health Sciences conducts economic 
modeling of school for 5 year projections. 
   
 Summer – Fall, 
2000 
Ad hoc school faculty/administrative review 
committee studies economic model and makes 
recommendations. 
   
 December 2000 Dean SAHS submits statement of financial 
difficulty to Dean SOM and to the Chancellor. 
   
 Spring 2001 School requests campus reallocation of $500,000 
to address financial problem as part of established 
campus budgeting/planning cycle. 
   
 Spring 2001 Appointment of ad hoc external review 
committee and recommendations (committee 
report provided to Executive Committee). 
   
 June 2001 Dean meets with school executive committee 
regarding committee reports and next steps. 
   
*Step 1 June 11, 2001 Dean distributes draft academic and budgeting 
plan to Allied Health faculty and Deans of 
schools with related programs (plan provided to 
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Executive Committee). 
   
Step 2 June 20, 2001 Faculty meeting with Chancellor, Dean SOM, 
and Dean of the Faculties to discuss next steps for 
faculty input prior to Dean’s submission of final 
set of recommendations and request for formal 
action (letter to faculty provided to Executive 
Committee). 
   
Step 3-4 August, 2001 Individual programs in School of Allied Health 
Sciences complete comments on Dean’s draft 
proposal (copies of program reports provided to 
Executive Committee). 
   
*NOTE:  Steps refer to those specified to the University’s Policy on Program Transfer, 
Merger, Reorganization, Reduction and Elimination. 
   
Step 3-4 September 7, 2001 Deadline for faculty commentary to be submitted 
to Dean SAHS (Note: faculty can continue to 
provide comments to Dean SAHS and Faculty 
Council’s Executive Committee until September 
24, or Step 8). 
   
Step 5 September 14, 
2001 
Deadline for Dean SAHS to submit a proposal to 
Dean SOM (and concurrently forwarded to Allied 
Health faculty and Faculty Council Executive 
Committee). 
   
Step 5 September 17, 
2001 
Deadline for Dean SOM to submit a proposal to 
Chancellor (and concurrently forwarded to Allied 
Health faculty and Executive Committee). 
   
Step 6 September 18, 
2001 
Deadline for Chancellor to refer report to Faculty 
Council Executive Committee (and concurrently 
Allied Health faculty). 
   
Step 7 September 20,2001 Executive Committee meets with Allied Health 
faculty (Note: Executive committee will assume 
responsibility for this matter without delegating).  
Time set for September 20, 1:30-3:30 p.m. in 
Nursing 103. 
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Step 8 September 24, 
2001 
Deadline for written comments to Executive 
Committee (comments should also address any 
materials added at Steps 5 and 6).  Send 
comments to University Faculty President. 
   
 September 27, 
2001 
Executive Committee meets to deliberate 
   
Step 9 September 28, 
2001 
Executive Committee deadline for submitting 
report to Chancellor, Dean SOM, and Dean 
SAHS. 
   
Step 10 October 1, 2001 Deadline for Dean SAHS and Dean SOM to 
submit response to Chancellor and Executive 
Committee. 
   
 
   Step 10 
October 2, 2001 Deadline for Executive Committee to submit 
Dean’s proposal, recommendation of Executive 
Committee and responses of Dean SAHS and 
Dean SOM to Faculty Council. 
   
Step 10 October 4, 2001 Meeting of University Faculty Council; one hour 
discussion of Allied Health scheduled. 
   
Step 11 October 10, 2001 Deadline for Chancellor to declare need for action 
and to refer proposal–as modified by Deans 
SAHS and SOM– to Executive Committee with 
Chancellor’s comments. 
   
Step 12 October 10-19, 
2001 
Period for Executive Committee to conduct open, 
campus-wide meeting(s). 
   
   
 October 11, 2001 An open meeting for all University faculty has 
been set for 2:00 - 4:00 in Nursing 103 (other 
meetings may be scheduled). 
   
 October 18, 2001 Executive Committee meets to deliberate. 
   
Step 12 October 24, 2001 Executive Committee distributes Deans’ proposal 
and Executive Committee response to Faculty 
Council. 
   
Step 13 November 1, 2001 Meeting of University Faculty Council; a 
discussion period (minimum of one hour) has 
been scheduled for the Council to deliberate and 
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to make recommendations to Chancellor. 
   
 November 2-30, 
2001 
Chancellor reviews Deans’ proposal, Faculty 
Council recommendations and other commentary 
and consults as necessary to make a final 
determination. 
   
Step 14 November 30, 
2001 
Chancellor forwards final determination to Dean 
SOM and Dean SAHS (with summary to Allied 
Health faculty, Faculty Council, and academic 
Deans). 
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Appendix C 
School of Allied Health Sciences Organizational Chart 
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Appendix D 
School of Allied Health Sciences Post Reorganization Chart 
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Appendix E 
Data Sources 
and 
Taxonomy Table 
 
 
 
Location 
 
 
INT   interview 
 
DOC   document 
 
P   participant observation 
 
 
Participant 
 
interviewees 
 
• Staff  SAHS Staff 
• UA  University Administrator 
• D   Dean 
• HE   Health Sciences Education 
• PD   Previous Dean 
• SFP  SAHS Faculty President, Radiologic Sciences 
• EM  Economic Modeling 
• OT   Occupational Therapy 
• RT   Respiratory Therapy 
• CL   Clinical Laboratory Sciences 
• PT   Physical Therapy 
• EAC  External Advisory Committee Member 
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documents. 
 
• SR   Dean’s Review committee 
• FS    External Advisory Committee Report 
• IUE  Whitman U. Faculty Council Executive Committee Report 
• RBB  Response of SOM Dean to Chancellor 
• SRB  SAHS Dean’s response to SOM Dean to IUE 
• FCR  Whitman U. faculty council recommendation for SAHS RP 
• PL   Dean of Faculties Letter to the SAHS Faculty 
• BMA  Chancellor’s Memo to SAHS Faculty 
• CPP  SAHS Program” combined Position Papers 
• BAHFM  SOM Dean’s Final Response to the Chancellor 
• SFLB  SAHS’s letter of submission to the final reorganization Plan 
• ARAP  Administration’s response to the faculties Alternative Plan 
• RPES  SAHS Dean’s reorganization Plan-Executive Summary 
• FPFCP  SAHS Faculty President’s Presentation to the Univ. Faculty C. 
• PD801  Program Directors Planning Meeting 8/01 
• PDRRP  Program Director’s Response to the RP 
• CLINL  Clinical Lab Programs Response to the Dean taking funds 
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Structural Categories 
 
 
I   Internal 
 
X   External 
 
L   Leadership 
 
Themes 
 
 
E   Economic 
 
FAC   Faculty 
 
ACC   Accreditation 
 
FC   Faculty Council 
 
BBA   Balanced Budget Act 
 
Good   Good leadership qualities 
 
Sch   School Status 
 
Bad   Bad leadership qualities 
 
Cul   Culture 
 
Cl   Merged Hospitals 
 
GE   Graduate Education 
 
RP   Reorganization Plan  
 
SI   School Independence 
 
XC   External Advisory Committee 
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Sub-themes 
 
 
PT   Physical Therapy Program 
 
OT   Occupational Therapy 
 
FED   Federal Legislation 
 
RCM   Responsibility Center Management 
 
EXP   Experience 
 
PD   Previous Dean 
 
FacA   Faculty Anger 
 
CP   Communication Problem with Dean 
 
RP   Reorganization Plan 
 
EM   Economic Modeling 
 
En   Enrollment 
 
HA   Higher administration 
 
UE   University Exigency Policy 
 
XF   Extramural Funding 
 
CL   Merged Hospitals 
 
SA   State Appropriations 
 
SOM   School of Medicine 
 
AP   SAHS Faculty Alternative Plan 
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